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Introduction 
Eight years  ago, in 1973-4, t he  United Farm Workers union a p p e a r e d  just o n e  
s t e p  s h o r t  o f  e n t e r i n g  t h e  h i s to ry  books a s  another valiant bu t  failed a t t e m p t  a t  
farmworker organization in the  United States. A t  t h a t  t i m e ,  t h e  g i a n t  T e a m s t e r s  
union had succeeded in burrowing i t s  way into the  fields through sweetheart  contracts  
negotiated with a frui t  and vegetable industry anxious t o  de te r  t h e  t enac ious  UFW. 
Through adroi t  political maneuvering and a timely return to  the business of organizing 
f a r m w o r k e r s ,  C e s a r  C h a v e z  and  t h e -  c o r e  of  t h e  union managed  t o  r e p e l  t h e  
i n t e r l o p e r s  wi th  s e c r e t  b a l l o t  e l e c t i o n s  c o n d u c t e d  under  t h e  nevrlv c h r i s t e n e d  
California Agricultural Labor Relations Act. Now the  ''social movement1' union faces 
a n o t h e r  a n d  p e r h a p s  m o r e  8 i f f i c u l t  battle ' :  a b a t t l e  a g a i n s t  t i m e  and machines. 
Despite t he  UFW's phenomenal success against what seemed insurmountable odds,  o r  
p e r h a p s  b e c a u s e  of t h a t  succes s ,  t h e  union now faces the possibility t h a t  a large 
number of workers-whom i t  so painstakingly organized will be displaced by machines 
eng inee red  wi th  ' one  purpose  in mind: lowering the cos t  of production by reducing 
"costljl labor1'. The costly labor referred t o  frequently in le t tuce,  grape and ci t rus  
industry publications is almost without exception union labor. But, the cos t  of labor 
is not simply c a l c u l a t e d  in  t e r m s  of w a g e s  a n d  b e n e f i t s ;  t h e  bes t -pa id  h a r v e s t  
worke r s  s t i l l  e a r n  l e s s  t h a n  85% of the  average wage in manufacturing industries. 
Rather,  t he  cos t  of labor is calculated in te rms  of the  loss of managerial flexibility: 
t h e  t i m F s p e n t  in ansvrering g r i evance  notices for cont rac t  infractions over issues 
such as pesticide overspraying, dangerous working conditions, arbitrary firings, sexual  
h a r r a s s m e n t  and  o t h e r  a c t i o n s  which employe r s  had previously .exercised without 
challenge. The  d e c r e a s e  in m a n a g e m e n t  d i s c r e t i o n  h a s  p r o m p t e d  a mechan ica l  
response: over the past fifteen .vears, more than $20 million dollars has been invested 
'-- 
by Federal  and S ta t e  governments and industry t o  devise cu l t iva t ion  and  harves t ing  
m a c h i n e s  su f f i c i en t l j l  f a s t  a n d  dex te rous  t o  replace hand labor. I l ~ s ,  the  United 
Farm Workers union, a f t e r  nearly a decade of transition from a social movement into 
a t r a d e  union c o n f r o n t s  a f u t u r e  in  which i t s  core organizational base (primarily 
l e t t uce  and grape workers) faces  dismemberment. 
T h e  d i l e m m a  fac ing  t h e  UFW is by no  m e a n s  a n  rrncommon one for t rade 
unions; t he  proportions o f .  t he  struggle seem much m o r e  d r a m a t i c  when viewed in 
l i g h t  of t h e  e p i c  c o n t e s t  betureen t h e  understaffed and financially undernourished 
UFW and the  well-heeled and prosperous agribusiness elite. The leaders of the UFU' 
need  n o t  look f a r  f o r  h i s t o r i c a l  examples  of t rade union response t o  the crisis i t  
faces: t he  Longshoremen's Union (ILwu), backed into a corner by the  introduction of 
containerization, chose to se t t l e  for a financial compensation and re-training solution 
(Larrowe, 1975; Weir, 1973); t h e  United Auto Workers and other industrial unions have 
c o n s i s t e n t l y  negotiated higher wages in return for increased productivity (Aronowitz, 
1975; Serrin, 1972). Unlike t h e  ILWU and  t h e  UAW, however ,  t h e  f a r m  workers '  
union has neither a massive membership base which &in withstand job reduction nor a 
sufficiently secure foothold i n .  t he  threatened industries t o  negotiate a compensa t ion  
so lu t ion .  With a membership concentrated i~ the  le t tuce and grape industries (both 
, with func.tiona1 mechanica l~a l te rna t ive  t o  hand l abo r ) .  and with mach ines  capab le  of  
displacing up t o  83% of t ha t  membership (Friedland, Barton and Thomas, 1981: 139- 
43; and Friedland, forthcoming), the  union cannot lose tha t  many jobs without facing 
organiza&mal bankruptcy. And, a s  the le t tuce industry strike demonstrated in 1978- 
79, without t he  means to quickly and effectively strike a significant financial blow t o  
1 
the i n d u s t r i e s  involved, the  union will clearlv b e  in a weak position t o  negotiate a 
- 
major compensation package or re-training program for displaced members (Bernstein, 
1982). 
Against this  backgroun.d, t h e  situation facing t h e  f a r m  workers '  union a p p e a r s  
none  t o o  op t imi s t i c .  Y e t ,  t h e  s t r e n g t h  of  t h e  union, and thus i t s  t rump card in 
facing an uncertain future, resides in t he  social movement base a n d  ideology which 
helped sustain i t  through the  frustrating years before i t s  string of election victories. 
Although it has incorporated many traditional t rade  union goals (or t rade union goals 
forged out  of collective bargaining narrowed t o  issues of wages and hours),. the UFW 
has also retained an organizational commitment  t o  broader issues of c iv i l  r i gh t s  f o r  
theMexican-Amer icans ,  Chicanos  a n d  La t inos  who h a v e  h a r v e s t e d  t h e  f r u i t s  of 
sou thwes te rn  f i e l d s  fo r  t h e - l a s t  ha l f -century .  Fo r  t h e  union and  many o f  i t s  
adherents,  the  struggle for legal and political rights, in addition t o  economic gain, has 
remained central;  t he  right of Chicanos and Hispanics generally t o  decent  education, 
po l i t i ca l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ,  legal- protection, adequate  health and medical  services and 
access t o  public institutions remain fundamental objectives of the organization. ~ h e s e  
o rgan  i z a t i o n a  1 g o a l s  and  an organizationa 1 philosophy of communal equality, though 
often the  ta rge t  of external abuse (e.g., from employers seeking the  predictability of 
a.  "business" 'union l ike t h e  T e a m s t e r s )  and  t h e  source of internal dissension (i.e., 
between and within staff and -membership), potentially provide a key  t o  t h e  union's 
survival - and a model for t he  future of the  labor movement a s  a whole. 
. -- 
In o r d e r  to uncover  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  a n d  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  of t h e  t h e  s o c i a l  
m o v e m e n t  s ide  of  t h e  UFW, i t  i s  f i r s t  n e c e s s a r y  t o  a n a l y z e  in some detail  the 
historical construction of t he  union. This paper represents a beginning s t e p  in  t h a t  
a n a l y s i s y a t h e r  t han  a n  e n d  p roduc t .  I t  w ' i l l ' be  similar in some respects t o  the 
relatively sizeable l i terature which h a s  a l r e a d y  a c c u m u l a t e d  on t h e  United F a r m  
Workers  union ( see ,  f o r  example: Baker, 1975; Brcrurn, 1968; Dunne, 1967; Friedland 
and Thomas, 1974; Jenkins, 1975; Jenkins a n d  P e r r o w ,  1977;  Kushner ,  1975; Levy, 
1975; London a n d  Anderson, 1970; Ma jka, 1978;  Ma t t i e s sen ,  1971; Tsylor, 1975; 
Thomas, 1981a; and Walsh, 1978) in t h a t  it will a t t e m p t  t o  sketch in t h e  ' role  of t he  
UFW in contrast  t o  t he  historical experience of other  fa rm worker unions. But, in at 
leas t  two ways it wil l  d i f f e r  f r o m  t h a t  p a s t  work: f i r s t ,  w e  wil l  a t t e m p t  t o  
c o m b i n e  a n  ana lys i s  of t h e  po l i t i ca l  economy o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p roduct ion  in the  
southwest w i th  a n  ana lys i s  of t h e  s t r a t e g i e s  a n d  a c t i o n s  which r e su l t ed  in t h e  
creation of a successful movement. Thus, in cont ras t  t o  the  recent  work by Jenkins 
(1975) and Jenkins and Perrow (1977) which focused  l a rge ly  on how t h e  po l i t i ca l  
atmosphere facili tated farm worker insurgency, we will argue tha t  political and, more 
importantly, structural factors  established important preconditions for mobilization but  
t h a t  they did not determine the  character  of t he  movement itself. 
Second, we will examine t h e  strategy and s tyle  of organization which the UFW 
unde r took  and  a s s e s s  t h e i r  impl ica t ions  for  t he  dilemma the union now faces. In 
other  words, we will argue, t he  success of t he  organization in achieving a measure of 
s t a b i l i t y  prev ious ly  unknown in a r g i c u l t u r e  c a n n o t  b e  ful ly  unders tood  wi thou t  
analyzing how it responded t o  t h e  structure i t  encountered and, conversely, how those 
responses shaped i t s  future possibilities. To clo this, we will examine the phases of 
organizational change experienced by the union. 
The paper consists of th ree  parts. The f i rs t  par t  will.consist of a n  analysis of 
the  political and economic  o rgan iza t ion  o f  a g r i c u l t u r e  in t h e  s o u t h w e s t  and  t h e  
o b s t a c l e s  i t  posed for the unionization of fa rm workers. ' The emphasis on political 
economy will underscore both t h e  l imi t a t ions  a n d  t h e  oppor tun i t i e s  which he lped  
d e t e r m i o e  t h e  f a t e  of  va r ious  a t t empt s  at unionization. In particular, t he  tact ics  
which accounted for successful mobilization, even momentary action, will be  linked t o  
t h a t  po l i t i ca l  economy,  T h e  second p a r t  wil l  f o c u s  on rise of the United Farm 
Workers union and will a t t e m p t  to expla in  i t s  s u c c e s s  in t e r m s  of t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  
changes which served a s  preconditions for mobilization - and the organizational tac t ics  
which responded t o  those changes. The  t h i r d  p a r t  wi l l  e x a m i n e  t h e  dynamics  o f  
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  c h a n g e  in t h e  UFW a n d  will consider t he  union's options for future 
action. I t  is in th i s  final par t  where we hope t o  provide an  in t eg ra t ed  ana lys is  o f  
t h e  organiza t iona l  problems engendered by the  politics of citizenship and the union's 
options for future action. 
Polit ical Economy of Agriculture and Unionization 
Although the  United Farm Workers union h e a d e d  by Cesar  C h a v e z  is o f t e n  
thought t o  b e  the  f i rs t  successful agricultural workers union in the nation, i t  is more 
correct ly  termed the  longest-running union. That is, a s  students of agricultural labor 
and 
h i s t o r y  h a v e  shown,  t h e  UFW w a s  p receeded  by a sizeable numher of unions less 
A 
formal  worker organizations (Jameison, 1945; Morin, 1952; Glass, 1968; Galarza, 1971 ; 
McWill iams,  197 1 ; London and  Anderson,  1970; P f e f f e r ,  1980; Watson, 1977; and 
Weiner, 1978). The Indus t r ia l  Workers  of t h e  World, a handfu l  of soc i a l i s t  a n d  
communist unions, the  Teamsters and a number of AFL and AFL-CIO creations at one 
t i m e  or a n o t h e r  t r i e d  t h e i r  hand in t h e  f ie lds .  Among,  t h e  AFL a n d  AFL-CIO 
e n t r a n t s  w e r e  t h e  fo l loa~ing:  t h e  United Packinghouse Workers (UPWA), Fruit  and 
Vegetable Workers  (FVW), Nat iona l .  F a r m  Labor  Union (NFLU) and  Agr i cu l tu ra l  
Workers  Organiz ing  commi t t ee  (AwOC). These and other organizations, while they 
may not have enjoyed the longevity of the UFW, nonetheless consi tututed i m p o r t a n t  
e f f o r t s  7 6  deve lop  a t  l e a s t  s o m e  measure of organization and protection for field 
workers. In addition to  the groups tha t  survived long enough (or had some  o f f i c i a l  
charter)  t o  acquire a place in historical l i terature were the short-lived but  significant 
collections of workers who banded together t o  mount a challenge t o  exp lo i t a t i on  by 
employers. 
The sporadic success of earlier farm worker unions, tallied i n  occas iona l  wage  
concess ions  o r  m o m e n t a r y  p r o t e c t i o n  f r o m  bul lying cannot b e  understood without 
consideration of the  obstacles  posed t o  worke r  o rgan iza t ion  by t h e  po l i t i ca l  a n d  
e c o n o m i c  s t r u c t u r e  of  a g r i c u l t u r e  in t h e  southwest .  One immediate and obvious 
obstacle  was t h e  intensely powerful and coercive political organization of agricultural 
employers. At  the  nationa 1 level, the American Farm Bureau Federation, particularly 
in the  period of the  1920s-60s, s tymied  t h e  e f f o r t s  of  i n d u s t r i a l  l abor  unions t o  
e x t e n d  t h e  umbre l l a  of  f e d e r a l  labor  leg is la t ion  t o  inc lude  f a r m  labor .  ' The  
Department  of  Agriculture, even during t h e  New Deal era ,  was a vir tual  c a p t i v e  o f  
t he  Farm Bureau i t  created (~cConne l1 ,  1977). Even when the  Farm Bureau failed t o  
develop a coherent strategy for overcoming regional and commodity c leavages  in i t s  
national membership, i t  managed to  organize a united front of agric-ultural employers 
implacable in their hostility t o  the unioniza t ion  of f a r m  l abor  (F isher ,  1953; a n d  
McConnel l ,  1977). Wielding t h e  s c e p t e r  of t h e  Jeffersonian ideology of yeoman 
agriculture and republican democracy ,  t h e  F a r m  Bureau p i e rced  a l l  a t t e m p t s  t o  
P 
include f a rm laborers within the  National Labor Relations Act  of 1935. 
At  t h e  l o c a l  leve l ,  t h e  J e f f e r son ian  gu i se  w a s  invoked wi th  ' less sub te l ty .  
Growers (as  they refer t o  themselves) brandished the  direct  force of local police and 
vigilantes t o  quash refusals to  a c c e p t  m e a g e r  wages  and  19 th  c e n t u r y  swea t shop  
working condi t ions .  Str ikebreakers  were imported from other a reas  t o  replace the  
discontented; though often those who broke the  strikes did so out  o f  a fight for their 
own su&al. When the opportunity arose, growers pitted ethnic  groups against one 
another,  exacerbating the antagonisms which already existed among equally powerless 
m e m b e r s  o f  a s p l i t  l abor  m a r k e t  (McWill iams,  1971). T h e  o u t c o m e  of  such 
competition, most commonly, was the  acceptance on the  par t  of one group of lower 
wages or  worse working conditions. The conflict  between ethnic  groups for work, a 
recur ren t  t heme  in t he  historical.  accounts, derived not  out  of some myopic inability 
to grasp common interests  but  ou t  of t he  f a c t  t h a t  a t  t h e  level of lived experience, 
ca tegor ies  of ethnicity were imposed upon competing groups and were used to shape 
the i r  existence. Often, particularly when communist  unions sought to intervene, local 
communit ies  ,would d rop  e t h n i c  o r  r a c i a l  ' condemna t ions  in f a v o r  o f  t h e  equa l ly  
Power fu l -  n e g a t i v e  r e f e r e n c e  to R e d  or Soviet communism as a t h r ea t  not only to 
agricul ture  but t he  en t i re  nation ( ~ u s h n e r ,  1975; and Galarza, 1971). 
Where t he  Farm Bureau derived i t s  leverage from i t s  parported representation of 
agr icul ture  nationally, local anti-union interests  derived from the i r s  f r o m  i m m e d i a t e  
d e p e n d e n c y  o f  l o c a l  m e r c h a n t s ,  po l i t i c ians ,  schools and churches on t h e  economic 
for tunes of growers. The rural towns of  Salinas, El Centro, Delano and  Bakers f ie ld  
d r e w  s u s t e n a n c e  f r o m  a g r i c u l t u r a l  economy just as much a s  southern communities 
were  dominated by cot ton plantations (cf. Goldschmidt, 1948, and Thompson, 1958, for 
a n  interesting contrast). 
A t  both the  local and national level, t he  concept  of "agricultural exceptionalism" 
served as a short-hand ra t iona le  f o r  t h e  exc lus ion  .of f a r m  l a b o r  f r o m  indus t r i a l  
legislation and for the  direction of national agricultural policy (Friedland and Thomas, 
1974). Exceptionalism, briefly, purported t h a t  agriculture by i t s  very nature  could not  
b e  equated with industiy: farming was small  business; farming was the.  cornerstone of 
a f r e e  polity; fa rmers  were subject  t o  t h e  v a g a r i e s  of  God, w e a t h e r  a n d  n a t u r a l  
calainity. Fisher phrased i t  qui te  eloquently: 
T h n a l i f o r n i a  farmer,  like other  American farmers,  is one of the 
principal audiences for  t h e  physiocratic legend. No ma t t e r  'whether  he 
t ravels  by private plane, employes a chaffeur,  ships by a i r  express and 
owns a produce market or two in Baltimore and New York, h e  is insistently. 
a fa rmer  engaged in society's most useful and necessary enterprise,  and 
ent i t led t o  t h e  special  consideration which t h e  dignity of his occupation 
commands. He regards himself as a natirral .agent o f  t h e  forces of freedom, 
which h e  is more likely' t o  define as freedom to raise, harvest and market  
his crop than as freedom of speech and assembly for those whose s take in 
society is less than ,his  own. He believes t h a t  he has  a right a s  a farmer 
to an adequate  supply of labor (1953: 94). 
In o t h e r  words ,  a g r i c u l t u r e  could '  n o t  w i t h s t a n d  the combined s t ress  of upholding 
democracy, weathering unpredictable acts of God and nature  and unions. 
Though t h e  t e m p t a t i o n  t o  dismiss 'these claims may b e  strong, particularly in 
light of t he - l a rge r  scale and greater  intensity of agriculture in California historically, 
t h e r e  is a n  e l e m e n t  o f  t r u t h  embedded in t he  ideology of exceptionalism. In the 
figure .below, we  have laid ou t  a rough and admittedly broad d iagram dep ic t i ng  t h e  
s t ruc tura l  fea tures  underlying the  political economy of agriculture in the  Southwest of 
t h e  1880s-1930s. The diagram is intended to cha r t  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  of t h e  e c o n o m i c  
o r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l '  p roduct ion  (beyond s i m p l e  property relations) on the 
division of labor in production and demand for labor. In turn,  these fac tors  are used 
t o  e x p l a i n  t h e  s t r a t e g i e s  of labor recruitment undertaken by agricultural firms and, 
finally, t h e  conditions for fa rm worker collective action. 
Figure 1 about  here  
A l t h u g h  t h e  t i m e - f r a m e  fo r  t h e  d i a g r a m  t e n d s  t o  t r u n c a t e  t h e  historical 
analysis somewhat, t he  period of 1880-1940 is a n  i m p o r t a n t  o n e  f o r  t h e  a rgumen t .  
The organization of agricultural production was character ized by relatively small firms 
4 
growing crops for local markets;  selling their  crops t o  brokerage a g e n t s  ( some t i m e s  
. 
\ 
p r o d u c e  c o m p a n i e s  b u t  mos t ly  ra i l road  companies)  who, in turn, sold the  crop at 
Figure 1: Effect of Political Economy of Agriculture 
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larger metropolitan produce terminals; or growing commodi t ies  under  c o n t r a c t  with 
processing firms which transformed those commodities ?e.g., wine grapes, tomatoes or 
b 
canning vegetables) into finished products (cf., Thomas ,  1 9 8 k  f o r  a m o r e  de t a i l ed  
d iscuss ion  of t h e  vary ing  product ion  a n d  c o n t r a c t i n g  a r r a n g e m e n t s  organized in 
southwestern agriculture during t h i s  per iod) .  Most  d i s t i n c t i v e  a b o u t  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
p roduc t ion  w a s  its seasona l  Bnd loca l ized  c h a r a c t e r .  T h a t  is ,  t h e  agr icu l tura l  
economy was typified by independent firms tied t o  particljlar geographic a reas  by land 
owner sh ip  and  c o n s t r a i n e d  in t h e i r  p roduct ion  c y c l e s  by t h e  seasonal  nature of 
agricljlture. Few if any firms produced in m o r e  t h a n  o n e  a r e a  e v e n ' t h o u g h  m o s t  
produced more than one crop during the t ime when weather permitted. Thus, there 
were no-- "inobile firms" (Thomas, 1981:48) producing ' l e t t u c e  o r  b rocco l i  on a dai ly  
basis throughout the  vear by leasing acreage in sca t te red  production areas. 
This geograph ia l  and organizational'discontinuity in product ion  a f f e c t e d  t h e  
d e g r e e s  of  f r e e d o m  open  t o  farm owners in organizing production. For most of it 
mean t  t h a t  the  demand for k b o r  was uneven at best. While highly sk i l led  fami ly  
labor could b e  called upon t o  maintain the  farm in the hiatus between planting and 
harvesting and during the  winter season, p l an t ing  a n d  ha rves t ing  c h o r e s  o f t e n  f a r  
outstripped the capacity of family labor. Hence, production was characterized by an 
uneven demand for ' l abor  with hired, non-family labor employed fo r  ' r e l a t i ve ly  s h o r t  
b u t  i n t e n s e  periods.  Given t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  a n d  geograph ic  d i scon t inu i ty  in 
production, few farm owners found i t  economically rational t o  invest in training hired, 
seasonal - tabor  t o  p e r f o r m  m o r e  than  a few relatively simple chores, e.g., how t o  
weed a field without damaging immature plants, how to  distinguish ripe from unripe 
f r u i t ,  how t o  p rope r ly  c u t  a n d  pack  the crop. The intense market orientation of 
most farms, especially with the  high cost of land and restricted access  t o  capital  for 
s m a l l  f i r m s ,  f u r t h e r  diminished f eas ib i l i t y  of a more continuous use of labor and 
heightened the  demand for unskilled, s easona l  w o r k e r s   ishe her, 1953): These  t w o  
f ac to r s - - a  demand  f o r  unskilled labor and the uneven demand for labor generally- 
combined t o  genera te  a specifically agricultural labor market. 
T h e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  l abor  m a r k e t  in t h e  s o u t h w e s t e r n  economy w a s  t h u s  one 
character ized by a demand for a highly elast ic  and mobile supply of low-wage labor. 
T h e  a c t u a l  cons t ruc t ion  of  t h e  labor  m a r k e t ,  however ,  w a s  a n  overt ly  political 
process. In order t o  satisfy a generalized need for labor which would be continuously 
available; unskilled, willing t o  t ravel  in search of employment, and willing to accept  
and 
meager wages, employers banded together on regional state levels (cf., Fisher's, 1953, 
A ,  
discuss ion  o f  employers' organizations and their e f for t s  t o  influence local, s t a t e  and 
national governments). Using their s u b s t a n t i a l  l e v e r a g e  a s  food p roduce r s ,  ma jo r  
c o n t r i b u t o r s  t o  t h e  r eg iona l  a n d  n a t i o n a l  economy,  defenders  of democracy, and 
guardians of traditional morals and values, employers and their representatives sought 
t o  construct  continuous sources of "a'ttractive" labor: a labor supply which would be 
available when needed for short periods but which could be externalized or jettisoned 
when unneeded. During the late 1800s through the 1 9 3 0 . ~ ~  a t t rac t ive  labor was found: 
largely in a succession of alien, ethnic workers. Thus, a s  London and Anderson (1970) 
a m o n g  o t h e r s  h a v e  noted :  "Indian, Chinese, Filipino, Japanese and Mexican workers 
followed o n e  ano the r ' s  f o o t s t e p s  i n t o  Cal i forn ia ' s  f ie lds ,  t h e r e  t o  f ind working 
cond i t i ons  v i r tua l ly-  unchanged since the initiation of commercial agriculture -in the 
mid-1800s" (London and Anderson, 197039). The recruitment of alien labor created a 
political.&-mediated labor  m a r k e t  (Thomas ,  198  1: C h a p t e r  2): one which gave t o  
employers considerable power in determining wage . levels and working condi t ions  a n d  
which s e v e r e l y  r e s t r i c t e d  t h e  c a p a c i t y  of workers to- negotiate.-the. -labor cont rac t  
through the  denial of the  political protections of citizenship. 
These  f a c t o r s  combined  t o  p roduce  myr iad  obstacles t o  the organization. of 
farm workers. Differences in 'language, culture and aspirations among ethnic groups, 
-a long wi th  t h e  c a p a c i t y  of 'employers to  set these groups in competition with one 
another, dampened the efforts  of domest ic  l abor  o rgan ize r s  t o  c r e a t e  a common 
ground fo r  organization. The elastic supply of labor curtailed the potential for any 
one organization t o  carry out a successful~work stoppage: dissidents were replaced by 
o t h e r  workers. The dispersed c h a r a c t e r  o f  employment ,  wi th  unmarked f ie lds  
separated from rural communities by miles of meandering roads, inhibited traditional 
w f a c  tory-gate" - leaflet t ing and speech-making. Finally, the migrancy of the workers 
themselves posed major problems in organization: the  short dura t ion  of employment  
o f  t en  precluded development of real '  organizational commitments before workers had 
to pack their belongings and scat ter  in search of the  next job. 
Though a l a t e r  development ,  the  Bracero  Program epitomized the politically 
mediated'  labor market. Begun in 1942 as a formalization of past labor recruitment 
p r a c t i c e s ,  t h e  Brace ro  Program established an open pipeline of Mexican workers to  
southwestern fields (cf., Calarza, 1964; Scruggs, 1960; and Craig ,  1971, for more  
thorough h i s to r i ca l '  accounts) .  The labor contract  which brought Mexican workers 
north was negotiated between growers (through their labor supply associations) and the  
and 
Mexican government stipulated wage levels and the  duration of employment prior t o  
A . - 
t h e  beginning of a season. Braceros  (Mexican c o n t r a c t  laborers) ,  lacking any 
organized means  by which to participate in wage negotiations, worked in the fields 
for the  length of their certification and then were returned t o  Mexico t o  reenter the  
pipeline- The abuses of the Bracero Program have been well-documented elsewhere 
(cf., Galarza, 1964) but deserve brief mention here because they bear directly on the  
- -- - 
issue of  f a r m  worker  organizat ion.  Because braceros were readily available a t  a 
price favorable to  employers, domestic workers were forced t o  e i ther  compe te  with 
t h e  c o n t r a c t  workers or leave the fields altogether. Despite numerous at tempts to  
publically d e m o n s t r a t e  t h e  a d v e r s e  a f f e c t  o f  non-c i t izen  worke r s  on wages  a n d  
working  conditions, labor organizers (in particular, organizers supported by the AFL- 
CIO-chartered National-Farm Laborers  un ion )  cou ld  n e i t h e r  o v e r c o m e  t h e  s h e e r  
p o l i t i c a l  s t r e n g t h  of  agricultural 'employers nor could they begin t o  make even the  
most  e lementary  advances in organizing the  braceros themselves. The in t r ans igence  
of employers was only bolstered hy the  increased importance of food supplies t o  the 
nation during t h e  Second World War and the Korean conflict. 
Thus, t he  political'and economic s t ructure of southwestern agriculture presented 
tremendous obstacles to  farm worker organization. The  s t r u c t u r a l  and  ideologica l  
fea tures  of - "agricultural exceptionalisrn"~ crea ted  a minefield for union organizers and 
their supporters. Yet, impassable as i t  may have seemed, the minefield did contain 
s o m e  l andmarks ,  s o m e  k e y s  t o  s a f e  passage .  Fo r ,  as we will. argue in the next  
section, while t he  agricultural~production system did foster  t remendous o b s t a c l e s  t o  
successful worker organization in unions, i t  also c rea ted  a set of relatively- diffuse, 
but oveklapping, social networks among farm laborers which provided the  potential for 
cohesion in a seemingly atomized labor force. 
Bases of Farm Worker Organization 
As  we sugges t ed  e a r l i e r ,  union organizat ion prior t o  the  development of the 
was 
United Farm Workers union sporadic in character.  But, r a t h e r  t han  e n u m e r a t e  t h e  A 
l o n g  l i s t  o f  succes ses  and  f a i lu re s ,  we  wil l  f o c u s  i n s t e a d  on t h e  f e a t u r e s  o f  
organizational - strategy which were shared by the  more successful groups. The three 
s o u r c e s  6f o r g a n  i za t iona  I' succes s  t o  which Ve will '  point--in formational  networks, 
residential/organizational stability, and similarity in communal~status-were much less 
t he  product of union action than they were character is t ics  of the production system 
itself. It was the  capacity of some unions ( w h a t e v e r  t h e i r  l ife-span) t o  t a p  i n t o  
these sources which accounted for their success. 
Informational 'networks. 
Among f a r m  workers ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  m i g r a n t s ,  good information is a valuable 
commodity. In a setting in' which work s i tes  a r e  scat tered over hundreds  of iniles,  
jobs a r e  unstable and short-term and employers and  local 'communities a r e  hostile and 
exploitative, the "grapevine" is more than just a source of gossip, it is a means  of  
surv iva l .  For  t h o s e  who have studied agricultural labor (or participated in it), the 
grapevine is an amazing thing: i t  is a carrier of stories, warnings, legends and f ac t s  
a b o u t  jobs, e m p l o y e r s  a n d  t h e i r  reputations, t he  best and wors t  places t o  eat and 
sleep, a s  well a s  a human telegraph connecting dis tant  f r iends ,  r e l a t i o n s  and ' l oved  
ones .  Even now, when formal- employment channels have been set up by companies 
and unions in the  major production areas,  t he  f a s t e s t  and m o s t  rel i -able  sou rce  of  
information about  where t o  find work i s  found in a local grapevine -"stationw: usually' 
a bar,  grocery or streetcorner gathering place in t he  barrio (for' a discussion of how 
o n e  of  t h e  a u t h o r s  found work when researching the le t tuce industry, cf.  Thomas, 
198 1: Chapter 4). 
Like the  network employed by the  workers described by Granovetter 
(1  974); t h e  g rapev ine  a m o n g  a g r i c u l t u r a l  ' w o r k e r s  is c o n s t r u c t e d  l a r g e l y  o n  a 
founda t ion  of  '!weak ties," -i.e., i n t e r a c t i o n s  between individuals which a r e  usually' 
momentary, limited a n d  non-binding in n a t u r e .  In fo rma t iona l  s e a r c h e s  g e n e r a t e  
c o n t a c t s  b e t w e e n  individuals who may only know one another in passing or who a r e  
connected through a common acquaintance. Unlike the  informational networks studied 
by G r a r m e t t e r ,  however ,  t h e  g rapev ine  a m o n g  agr icu l tura l 'workers  is a durable' 
network. It is  created and re-created out  of t h e  conditions of employment imposed 
on. t h e  f a r m  labor  f o r c e  a n d  is,  s imu l t aneous ly ,  --a --cr i t ical7.  precondit-ion- for  the-  
successful operation of the  agricljltural p roduc t ion  sys t em.  T h a t  is, in o rde r  f o r  
employers t o  rely on the  availability of enough hands for cultivation or harvesting, a 
well-organized grapevine must ex is t  t o  carry t h e  news of work openings. 
It is the  importance of t he  grapevine t o  workers -as  a means of survival and t o  
employers a s  a labor  r e c r u i t m e n t  d e v i c e  which g ives  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n a l ' n e t w o r k  
Potential  a s  an organizing tool. If t he  informational' network can b e  tapped into or 
manipulated consciously, then those who rely upon i t  can b e  o rgan ized ,  too.  Thus, 
f o r  example ,  t h e  IWW used t h e  grapevine among bindlestiffs and frui t  t ramps (male 
migrant workers) in the  early pa r t  of the  1900s a s  a device for relaying information 
a b o u t  empl .oye r s  a n d  worker  rebel l ions.  Even m o r e  powerfu l ly ,  t h e  Wobblies 
effectively dominated t h e  r a i l r o a d  l i n e s  as a rap id  m e a n s  by which t o  d i spa t ch  
organizers who carried in for m a t  ion t o  distant places and t o  connect dispersed groups 
of workers. In other words, IWW organizers became nodes for information collected 
by t h e  union a n d  t h e r e f o r e  c e n t e r s  of  a t t e n t i o n  among  migrant- workers. Later 
unionizing effor ts  also capitalized on the  grapevine in similar fashion. 
Just  a s  access  t o  information proved .a valuable asset  for union organizers, t he  
p r a c t i c e  of  ga ther . ing  and  man ipu la t ing  in fo rma t ion  was  n o t  l imi t ed  t o  unions. 
Individuals  could  a l s o  m a k e  themse lves  nodes of information and profit  from i t  in 
. . 
monetary terms.  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  s o m e  set t h e m s e l v e s  u p  a s  midd lemen  b e t w e e n  
e m p l o y e r s  seeking  worke r s  a n d  workers seeking jobs. These middlemen, commonly 
known as- labor  contractors,  were s i m i l k  to what Bonacich refers  to in other settings 
a s  "middleman minorities" (1973) in t h a t  they acquired . a  s ta tus  higher than t h a t  of 
the  workers they organized but 'lower than t h a t  of  employe r s .  Labor  c o n t r a c t o r s  
based  t b d r  pos i t ion  on  a monopoly'  ove r  i n f o r m a t i o n  a n d  used tha t  monopoly' t o  
ex t r ac t  a living: by establishing contacts  with employers and agreeing to furnish and 
.sup-ervise . labor,  t h e y  would charge a r a t e  for their  services, g a t h e r  workers into a - - . -1 
c r e w ,  pay  t h e  c r e w  a wage  a n d  p o c k e t  t h e  r e s t .  For  e m p l o y e r s ,  t h e  ' l a b o r  
c o n t r a c t o r s  provided a useful service: they reduced the uncertainties of recruitment,  
. . 
spoke the"1anguage of t h e  workers and saw t o  i t  t h a t  workers  w e r e  r emoved  when 
they were not  needed. Though conscious of their  exploitation, workers recognized the  - 
necessity of seeking out  k b o r  contractors. Since many could not speak the language 
of  t he  employer or  undertake the  expense of searching for jobs, t h e  labor contractor 
was a necessary ev i l 'k f . ,  Friedland and Nelkin, 1971, f o r  a v i ew of modern  labor  
contracting and i t s  similarity t o  past  forms). It should not b e  surprising, therefore,  
t h a t  t h e  d e s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e  l abo r -con t r ac t ing  s y s t e m  b e c a m e  one  of t h e  f i r s t  
objectives of t he  United Farm Workers union. More importantly, i t  was the effect ive 
use of the  grapevine (and subsequent a t t e m p t  t o  c o n c r e t i z e  i t  in t h e  hir ing ha l l )  
which proved integral- t o  t he  UFW's organizational development in the  1960s. 
Residential/organizational stability. 
Even in a p roduc t ion  s y s t e m  which demanded  migration among workers and 
enforced i t  through the  denial of citizenship an-d'legal'protection, pockets of stability 
w e r e  f o r m e d  and served a s  another source of organizational strength for some farm 
w o r k e r  unions. The  shanty- towns  and  d i spe r sed  ne ighborhoods  s e r v e d  a s  t h e  
-"wintering" .grounds f o r  many f a r m  worke r s  when they were not off in search of 
work. Unlike the  camps found on d i t ch4anks  or  nestled in orchards w h e r e  worke r s  
s lept  while on t h e  road, farm worker set t lements  offered something of an  anchor t o  
migrants and union organizers. Areas like ~ e b b r o n  H e i g h t s  ( r e f e r r e d  t o  as- vlOkie 
townw' in t he  1930s) on the  outskirts of Salinas, Guadalupe (outside Santa Maria along 
California's centriil coast), Lanare (west of Fresno) ,  and  De lano  ( n e a r  Bakers f ie ld)  
sprang rich agricultural '  districts which offered employment over relatively long 
periods of time. In those communities, a measure of resident ial  s t a b i l i t y  could  b e  
- . - 
achieved and with tha t  stabili ty a greater  cer tainty tha t  o r g a n i z i " c ~ f f o r t s  might be  
mustered t o  last more than just a few weeks before work ended and workers had t o  
move on. The familiarity tha t  comes with living in the  same place more than just a 
f ew  weeks could serve t o  enhance the chances for developing cohesive organiza t ion .  
Because these  communities were under the  constant  watchful e y e  of local police and 
growers,  organizing ef for t s  were of ten secre t  or  a t ' l e a s t  low key ,  focusing no t  on  
o v e r t  i s sues  o f  wages and hours but  on mutual support, e.g., raising food and funds 
for  famil ies  in need or pooling resources t o  ensure survival through long, .money le s s  
winters. 
Grasping the  divisive potential '  of farm worker set t lements ,  some growers sought 
to provide housing on their own property so a s  t o  maximize t h e i r  ab i l i t y  t o  moun t  
surveillance and t o  quick ly  disperse collective action. "Ranch1'- or "labor" camps were 
o f t en  l i t t l e  more than converted chicken coops or barns ;  b u t  t hey  se rved  t h e  d u a l  
purpose of tying workers and their families t o  t h e  farm (making occupancy dependent 
upon obedience and stability in work) and containing the  labor force isolated from the  
r e s t  of .society (i.e., union organizers). 
To the  ex t en t  t ha t  farm worker set t lements  did survive, however, they provided 
social cen ters  into .which union o rgan ize r s  could  e n t e r  ( o f t e n  under  t h e  cove r  o f  
night), find shelter and food, and '  slowly develop an audience for their message. Like 
the i r  guerilla counterparts  in the  h igh lads  of G u a t e m a l a ,  Nicaragua  and  Vie tnam,  
union organizers for the  IWW and other unions of ten used song and quasi-theater both 
to spread a message of so l idar i ty  and  t o  h igh l igh t  t h e  fb ib l e s  of - t h e  seemingly  
invulnerable enemy: employers. Songs written by Joe  Hill and corridas (Mexican folk 
ballads) turned the  enemy into a buffoons and a t t empted  t o  turn the  lives of workers 
facing hunger and deprivation into the stuff of heroic legends. The development of 
an understanding of the commonality of people's lives and of the destructive e f f ec t s  
0 f l abo r  m a r k e t  competit ion, while not easily translated into collective action, still 
provided a measure of soldiarity which could b e  with t ime transformed into cohesive 
o r g a n i z a t i o n .  Unfor tuna te ly ,  many organizing ef for t s  hcked  the t ime necessary t o  
move from the stirrings of common consc iousness  t o  cohes ive  organiza t ion .  T h e  
beginning of . the season (and the  need t o  set o u t  once again in search of work) and 
the fearsome raids of vigilantes of ten undid the  careful  work of many nights. 
Ano the r ,  o f t e n  over looked ,  sou rce  of sTabilify resided in the  work process of 
some agricultural'industries. Though most  ha rves t ing  r equ i r ed  l i t t l e  m o r e  than  a 
s t r o n g  back  o r  quick hands ,  s o m e  jobs demanded a fairly ' high level' of skill. The 
pruning of  grape vineyards. at the  end of t h e  season  and  t h e  ha rves t ing  o f  highly 
p e r i s h a b l e  v e g e t a b l e s  l ike  a s p a r a g u s  and  l e t t u c e  demanded grea te r  individual Bnd 
collective skill than most other  crops and the  people who worked in those industries 
t e n d e d  t o  b e c o m e  special is ts  in their jobs. Though their skills only' net ted them a 
few cen t s  more than common 'laborers, grape, asparagus and  l e t t u c e  worke r s  could  
achieve grea te r  stability in employment and could, potentially, form t h e  core of union 
organization. Grape ar id ' le t tuce workers, a s  we shall  g o  on t o  d e m o n s t r a t e ,  w e r e  
consc ious ly  chosen  by t h e  United Farm Workers precisely for these characteristics.  
But, even before the successful effor ts  of the UFW, Japanese and  Fi l ipino worke r s  
sought t o  achieve a monopoly over access t o  t he  grape vineyards and asparagus fields 
in o r d e r  t o  a s s e r t  union-like barga in ing  l e v e r a g e  wi th  e m p l o y e r s  ( c f  ., F i s h e r ,  
1953:Ch.3). As Galarza describes in his account of t h e  NFLU's long struggle with the 
DiGiorgio Company (a major table  grape manufac turer  in t he  San Joaquin  Valley o f  
California), t h e  skills of grape workers were the  closest approximation the  AFL could 
find t o  an aristocracy of agricultural labor (Galarza, 1971). 
Such- n i ches  o f  organizational' o r  occupational' stability in the  farm labor force 
were, however, few and fa r  between; though, aswewi l l  argue later,  differentiation in 
1 - 
t h e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  labor..-process- i nc reased  wi th  s t r u c t u r a l  c h a n g e s  .in - t he  political . -- ' 
economy ,of agriculture. Many firms sought t o  c e n t r a l i z e  ski l led jobs in ' locat ions 
o u t s i d e  t h e  f i e l d s  a n d  in t h o s e  loca t ions  t o  rat ional ize production when possible. 
Thus, for  example, t he  exacting jobs of trimming and packing head le t tuce  (critical t o  
t h e  p r e s e r v a t i o n  o f  a per i shable-  commodi ty  to b e  transported t o  distant markets) 
w e r e ,  u n t i l  t h e  e a r l y  1950s  c e n t r a l i z e d  in  pack ingsheds  where  work  c o u l d .  b e  
monitored and . closely supervised (cf., Smith 1961 ; Glass, 1968; and Friedland, Barton 
and Thomas, 1981: 65-68 for a brief description of the  packing process). Tr imming 
and packing in t h e  sheds was organized around conveyors and, in large part  because 
the  coverage of shed work under the NLRA gave impetus t o  unionizing ef for t s  by the  
T e a m s t e r s  a n d  t h e  United Packinghouse  Workers,  growers were constantly- on the  
lookout for ways t o  reduce the  need for labor there. It is important t o  note in this 
c o n n e c t i o n  t h a t  when new technology f o r  r e f r ige ra t ing  produce became abailable 
(vacuum-cooling instead of t he .  labor-intensive icing process),  i t  w a s  combined  w i t h  
t h e  mass ive  i m p o r t a t i o n  of  b r a c e r o s  f r o m  Mexico t o  c r e a t e  an- integrated labor 
process in t he  fields. That is, cutting, trimming and packing w e r e  u n i t e d  as f i e ld  
a c t i v i t i e s  engag ing  c r e w s  of  i n t e r d e p e n d e n t  workers .  T h e  ."en-skillirig" of field 
harvesting was only undertaken when i t  became c lear  to employers  t h a t  t h e y  could  
a v a i l ' t h e m s e l v e s  of  highly~vulnerable  labor (for an analysis of changes in the  labor 
process in the  le t tuce  industry, cf., momas.  1981b: Chapters 3 and 5). 
T h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  poss ib i l i t i es  in w o r k e r s .  who w e r e  r e s iden t i a l l y '  and/or  
organizationally and occupationally stable were not overlooked by  unions. Y e t ,  t h e  
p o t e n t i a l i t i e s  w e r e  n o t  a l w a y s  realized 'for many of t he  reasons already described: 
farm worker set t lements  were of ten  vulnerable t o  penetration by grower a g e n t s  a n d  
i n t i m i d k n  th rough  f o r c e ;  IMa l  organizers and sympathizers were generally easily 
recognized and singled out for punishment; skill level j  were reb t ive ly  high for some 
4 
workers bu t  few workers were indispensable. .. . . -. - - .  . . ,  ... .... .. . -  . . - - - -  - - . -  
Similarities in communal ' status. 
T h e  e m p l o y e r  s t r a t e g y  of impor t ing  and manipulating workers from different 
e thnic  and raciA1 groups proved a generally powerful d e t e r r e n t  t o  union organizers .  
' 
B u t ,  a t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e ,  c o n s t a n t  h a r r a s s m e n t  and discrimination did tend to  push 
members  of t he  same ethnic group together: Chinese, Japanese, Filipino and Mexican 
w o r k e r s  banded  toge ther  in a defensive posture, though they remained largely apart  
f rom one  another. Where some unions interested in organizing these disparate groups 
found t h e  e t h n i c  enc l aves  d i f f icu l t ' to  penetrate ,  o thers  actively'  sought t o  generate 
solidarity through similarities in communal s t a t u s .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  J apanese  worke r s  
o r g a n i z e d  t h e m s e l v e s .  i n t e rna l ly ,  using overlapp'ing f ami ly  t i e s ,  t h e  s t r e n g t h  of 
patr iarchal  leadership within the family, and traditional~cultural~and religious va lues  
t o  p r o t e c t  t h e m s e l v e s  a n d  p r o m o t e  fami ly  well-being (cf., McWilliams, 1971: and 
London and  Anderson,  1970). In d i r e c t  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  Ch inese  (and p e r h a p s  
consc ious ly  so),  t h e  J a p a n e s e  prevented  the development of an exploitative labor- 
contract ing system in which certain members of t h e  s a m e  e t h n i c  group would u s e  
their knowledge of the  language, their monopoly over information and their informal 
c o n t a c t s  wi th  e m p l o y e r s  t o  t h e i r  own p ro f i t .  F a m i l i a l  and  c u l t u r a l  t i e s  w e r e  
e v e n t u a l l y  e l abo ra t ed  into fairly powerful labor supply associations which negotiated 
informal ' agreements  with employers (in lieu o f  w r i t t e n  c o n t r a c t s )  . bu t  which w e r e  
nonetheless forer-unners of union contracts. The success of t he  Japanese in securing 
control  over access  t o  certain a reas  and jobs (especialIy the  more skilled jobs) made 
t h e m  a m o r e  influential force than many employers f e l t  comfortable with; however, 
the  o b j e c t i v e  of m o s t  J a p a n e s e  worke r s  a n d  t h e i r  f a m i l i e s  was  not  p e r m a n e n t  
employmerrt a s  field hands. Instead, organization through extended family groups was 
designed a s  a device for pooling resources a n d  purchas ing  land.  Needless  t o  say ,  
though many J a p a n e s e  f a m i l i e s  w e r e  e v e n t u a l l y  s u c c e s s f u l  in acquiring land a n d .  
becoming employers themselves, their populitr ity did not increase significantly a s  they 
entered into d i rec t  competition with other agricultural '  producers. 
Filipino workers, many of whom emigrated as s i n g l e  men,  ach ieved  a s imi l a r  
order of organization, especially- a f t e r  t he  expulsion of - t he  Japanese in 1917. Lacking 
the  extensive kinship networks of the  Japanese, Filipino men tended t o  aggregate in 
cer tain occupations, e.g., grapes and a variety of vegetable harvests. Firmly p'hced 
in skilled work, they would mig ra t e  w i th  t h e  season  and  u s e  t h e i r  l e v e r a g e  w i t h  
e m p l o y e r s  t o  s e c u r e  .employment  fo r  t h e i r  countrymen. As the small 'numbers of 
F i l ip ino  women and fami ly  m e m b e r s  t r i c k l e d  i n t o  t h e  U.S., i s o l a t e d  e t h n i c  
communities began t o  develop on the  outskirts of agricultural production centers  like 
Sdlinas, Guadalupe, Santa Clara and Los Angeles. Though those  s e t t l e m e n t s  n e v e r  
\ 
g r e w  v e r y  l a r g e ,  t hey  did b e c o m e  o u t p o s t s  of Filipino cul ture  were s t r ee t  corner 
conversation swung with the various dialects  of t h e  i s lands  and  t a lk  of  unionizing 
could  e x t e n d  beyond t h e  whispers permitted in t h e  fields. The quas ic i t izen  s ta tus  
permit ted Filipino emigres enhanced their position a s  community members, at least  in 
terms of t he  claims made against them by local. governmental' representatives (e.g., t o  
sign up .for t h e  draf t ) .  But ,  e v e n  wi th  second-c lass  c i t i z e n s h i p  Fi l ipino worke r  
associations were t reated harshly. by employers  atso son, 1977).  onet the less, i t  was a 
predominantly Filipino union, the  Agricultural Workers Organizing C o m m i t t e e  (AFL- 
CIO) which later  played an  important role in spurring the  development of a successful 
organizing e f fo r t .  in t he  grape industry in 1965-66. 
Final ly ,  t h e  Wobbies sough t ,  w i th  mixed succes s ,  t o  combine similarities in 
regional.origin among the Okies and Arkies who - t ramped the  fields of the southwest 
with theiF-common s ta tus  a s  'lAmericanslr t o  achieve a higher level- of solidarity. By 
constantly summoning up the  paradox of "Americans 'living of f  t h e  s w e a t  of  o t h e r  
Americans",-they would expound upon the injustices being perpetrated against cit izens 
while, a t  the  same time, using the music and the  regional folklore of the  workers t o  
give organization a distinctly regional flavor. Though, a s  suggested earlier,  this  was 
by no means the  only tac t ic  t he  IWW undertook, it had t h e  e f f e c t  of  a s s e r t i n g  a 
commonality of national And cultural '  her i tage t o  bind workers t o  one another.  
* * + +  
Thus, t h e  political and economic s t ructure of agriculture simultaneously c rea ted  
obstacles  to organization and bases upon which o r g a n i z a t i o n  could  b e  bui l t .  The  
ability of indigenous groups of farm laborers and organizers from outside t o  t a p  into 
the  potential  'of informational ' networks, sources  of  s t ab i l i t y  and  c o m m o n a l i t i e s  in 
s t a t u s  a n d  e t h n i c i t y  (singularljl- or in combination) helps account for success in t he  
most hostile of settings. As ur+ill go on t o  argue in t h e  n e x t  t w o  sec t ions ,  t h e  
durability of organiztion found in t he  United Farm Workers union can b e  t raced t o  i t s  
remarkable interlacing of these fea tures  of  t h e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  l abor  force .  Equal ly 
i m p o r t a n t ,  however, s t ructural  changes in the  organization of agricultural. production 
served t o  enhance the  potential  of collective action. 
Structural  Change in Argiculture and the  Bases of UFW Success 
Recent work analyzing the  history and s tructure of t he  farm workers' movement 
in t h e  Sou thwes t  h a s  focused  cons ide rab le '  a t tent ion on the  role of environmental 
f ac to r s  in determining the  success of he United Farm Workers union. J enk ins  in a n  
extended study (1975) and in an later a r t ic le 'wi th  Perrow (1977) points t o  the  helping 
hand extended by a l iberal-nat ional  e l i te  a s  the c r i t i c a l -  f a c t o r  d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  t h e  
UFW f r t m  i t s  p redecesso r s .  This  "sugar daddym hypothesis suggests t ha t  external  
p o l i t i e l  and sociii1 forces, act ing through the  Democratic Party and allied urban and 
- . . -- -  .. . . 
l abo r  powers ,  cleared the way for successful farm work<rorganizing by neutralizing 
Congression~l~opposition t o  agricultural unionism and by providing d i rec t  access  to a n  
urban audience sympathetic to the  plight of southwestern campesinos (farm workers). 
.-- 
This argument,  while capturing elements  of t he  situation, mi s ses  t h e  mark  when i t  
focuses i ts.  analyjis at the  level- o f  national. polit ics and h rge ly -  ignores t he  unfolding 
of t he  story at the  l o e l '  level. In particular, two of t he  major--"victorie-s" s ecu red  
f o r  t h e  f a r m  workers  by the  national liberal elite-the end of t he  Bracero Program 
and t h e  provision of access t o  sympathetic urban audiences- -were  n o t  unmi t iga t ed  
-b less ings  f o r  t h e  growing union. A t h i rd  f a c t o r ,  underemphasized in Jenkins and 
Perrow , was nonetheless one which. clearly a f fec ted  the  nature of the opposition the  
UFW f a c e d .  We r e f e r  h e r e  t o  t h e  cons iderable-  changes which took place in the  
economic organization of agriculture (particularly in ~ a l i f o r n i a )  during t h e  period o f  
1940-1970. In this  section, those three factors--the end of the  Bracero Program, the  
urban audience, and . long-term change in t he  economic organization o f  ag r i cu l tu re - -  
wil l  - b e  a n a l y z e d  in l i gh t  o f  t h e i r  contribution t o  the  success of -the United Farm 
Workers movement. 
End of t he  Bracero Program 
Though t h e  B r a c e r o  P r o g r a m  was  o f f i c i a l l y  b rough t  to an end in 1965, t h e  
cont rac t . labor  s y s t e m  had  b e e n  under  a t t a c k  s ince  t h e  e n d  of  t h e  Korean War 
(Scruggs, 1960 ; Craig, 1971; Galarza; 1971). The program had initially 'been designed 
as a stop-gap m e s u r e :  its implementation in 1942 was aimed to fill a temporary void 
in t he  supply of farm labor at the outset of WWII caused by the  internment of t he  
Japanese, the  enlistment of many Filipino farm w o r k e r s  a n d  t h e  m o v e m e n t  of t h e  
remnants of Depression migrants into defense industries. Yet,  in successive years the 
program-was ex tended ;  Sou thwes te rn  g rowers ,  in p a r t i c u l a r ,  had  b e c o m e  q u i t e  
a c c u s t o m e d  t o  t h e  ava i l ab i l i t y  of Mexican seasonal' workers on demand and fought 
- - - . -- -- - . - - . - .  - 4- -. 
tenaciously against effor ts  t o  phase the  program out. The flood of Mexican nationals 
not only' guaranteed almost complete employer domination of t he  content  of the work 
process and wages, i t  had the added  b e n e f i t  o f  a c t i v e l y  d e t e r r i n g  t h e  succes s fu l  
penetration of domestic unions into the fields. As in  p rev ious '  c l a shes ,  indigenous 
f a r m  w o r k e r  g r o u p s  a n d  e x  ternally-funded char te red  'unions bat t led locally' powerful 
employers over wages and working conditions while capturing l i t t le  a t  t e n t  ion at  t h e  
n a t i o n a l  l eve l ,  e spec i a l ly .  during t h e  ~ i s e n h o w e r  admin i s t r a t i on .  When domestic 
workers did t ake  jobs in the fields, they commonly worked '  a longs ide  b r a c e r o s  a n d  
were forced t o  accep t  wages set at a prevailing rate by employers in their one-sided 
negotiations with the Mexican government ( the ostensible, but largely silent bargaining 
a g e n t  f o r  t h e  b race ros ) .  Despite t he  pract ice of -!'wage-fixing" -described by Fuller 
(1 955), growers were  never openly challenged by the judicial or executive branches o f  
t h e  f e d e r a l  g o v e r n m e n t .  Thus, e v e n  in protracted contests  between unionists and 
employers, such as the s t r i ke  by m e m b e r s  of  t h e  Na t iona l  F a r m  Labore r s  Union 
a g a i n s t  t h e  DiGiorgio Company in the  mid-1950s (cf., Galaiza,  197-11, bracero labor 
played a pivotal role in maintaining grower hegemony over production. 
' 
With t h e  e l e c t i o n  o f  John Kennedy in 1960,  t h e  Congressional debate  over 
termination of t he  Bracero Program pi tched in f a v o r  o f  union a n d  l i be ra l  fo rces .  
Two anti-Bracero arguments, in particular, gained a sympathetic ear: first  , with rising 
unemployment in the nations' c i t i es  (a partial  'consequence of the  massive no r thward  
migration of displaced b k c k  - farmworkers and sharecroppers), t h e  potential  availability 
of thousands of uneinployed urban residents a s  d o m e s t i c  r e p l a c e m e n t s  fo r  Mexican 
m i g r a n t s  b e c a m e  a r a t i o n a l e  fo r  t e r m i n a t i o n  of  t h e  program; and, second, union 
backers of the  new Democratic administration sought t o  extend their influence in the  
rapidly' developing food industry (i.e., the  growing corporate-dominated food processing 
and packaging sector) by establishing a solid foundation in t h e  f i e ld s  ( ~ r a i g ,  1971). 
a 
The  an t i -Brace ro  c a m p a i g n  ga ined  momen tum in t h e  f i r s t  years  of t he  Kennedy. 
Administration and dismantling of the program began in 1964-5. 
The termination of the Bracero Program, paradoxically, was  not vieived with the 
same  f ea r  across all agricultural 'industries in the  Southwest. Although i t  would b e  
n a i v e  t o  . a r g u e  t h a t  a n y  e m p l o y e r  would welcom; t h e  removal .  o f  doc i l e  and  
manipulable labor, e l e m e n t s  of  s e v e r a l  ' i ndus t r i e s  had  found t h e  B r a c e r o  sys t em 
s o m e w h a t  l e s s  t h a n  i d e a l ' e v e n  during i t s  most p o p u h i  period. As Thomas (1981b: 
Ch.5) no tes  in his study of the l e t t uce  industry, for e x a m p l e ,  a number  o f  l e t t u c e  
g r o w e r s  had  developed  a s t r a t egy  of employing braceros for  the  least skilled work 
whi le  h i r ing  undocumented  worke r s  or  p e r m a n e n t  i m m i g r a n t s  (i.e ., t h o s e  w i t h  
documen  t a t i o n  t e s t i f y i n g  t o  t h e i r  pe rmamen t  residence status) t o  make up stable, 
skilled h a r v e s t  c r ews .  For  t h e s e  e m p l o y e r s  in p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h e  sho r t - t e rm work 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n s  l imi ted  t h e  u t i l i t y  of  braceros for t he  newly developed "integrated" 
harvesting method described earlier; furthermore, there  were few guarantees tha t  the  
s a m e  b r a c e r o s  could b e  contracted on a year-to-year basis. Hence, le t tuce growers 
hesitated t o  use braceros in the  harvest. Some employers managed  t o  a r r a n g e  f o r  
t h e  s a m e  b r a c e r o s  t o  b e  employed annually, bu t  a t  a cos t  of healthy bribes t o  the 
Mexican bureaucrats who organized. the  recruitment and distribution of labor south of 
t h e  bo rde r .  With b r i b e s  f a c t o r e d  into wage cost,  many employers opted for non- 
bracero labor. 
Os tens ib ly ,  t h e  t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  Bracero Program should have changed the  
composition and the s t ructure o f  t h e  a r g i e u l t u r a l  l abor  marke t .  As Jenk ins  and  
argued, 
P e r r o w  (1977) t h e  succes s  of t h e  national liberal' e l i t e  in removing this barrier did A 
indeed enhance the  prospects of the  UFW. Y e t ,  t h e  e n d  o f  t h e  p rog ram did n o t  
s i g n a l  tfm e n d  of t he  problem. First, t he  termination of t he  Bracero Program was 
not accompanied by a major change in the legal s ta tus  of  f a r m  labor:  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
? - 
w o r k e r s  -continued-.to work outside the protections - o f  the National Labor Relations.  -. - -- 
Act; equally important, individual states remained fully in c o n t r o l  of t h e  e l ig ib i l i ty  
r e q u i r e m e n t s  f o r  t h e  r e c e i p t  o f  unemploymen t  and workmen's compensation, food 
subsidies and transfer payments. Thus, f a r m  w o r k e r s  con t inued  t o  b e  dev i l ed  by 
"agricultural excep t i~na l i sm '~ ,  on the  one hand, and by- the  ability of local politicians 
t o  enforce their mobilty between agricultural 'employers,  on the  other hand. Second, 
t h e  r e p l a c e m e n t  of  t h e  Mexican worke r s  by t h e  d o m e s t i c  unemployed failed t o  
materialize. Agricultural ' employers, angered by t h e  ' loss of t h e i r  elastic supply o f  
labor, did l i t t le,  of course, t o  a t t r a c t  cit izen workers into the  fields. Wage increases 
were minimal 'and remained below those available in manufacturing; f u r t h e r m o r e ,  no  
significant e f for t s  were made t o  up-grade ei ther  t h e  working conditions or t he  s ta tus  
of farm work. Many of the  urban unemployed, on the other hand, e i ther  refused t o  
a c c e p t  a g r i c u l t u r a l  -working conditions  n referring t o  stay in t he  cities) or le f t  the 
fields a f t e r  a short trial-period. And, t h i rd ,  t h e  o f f i c i a l -  demise  of  t h e  B r a c e r o  
Program was not itself complete: l e f t  behind as a loophole' in the -McCarran-Walter 
Immigration Act of 1952 was a clause allowing for t h e  e m e r g e n c y  c e r t i f i c a t i o n  of  
foreign immigration in case of a shortage of specific categories of labor. With the 
o n s e t  of  t h e  s u m m e r  season  o f  1965 and  t h e  a p p a r e n t  s h o r t a g e  o f  d o m e s t i c  
r e p  l a c e  men ts, Ca l i fo rn i a  g r o w e r s  petit ioned t h e  Secretary of Labor for emergency 
supplies of Mexican nationals to u n d e r t a k e  t h e  h a r v e s t  (cf., Western Grower  a n d  
Shipper ,  May, 1965). The  impor t a t ion  of  -"green-cards" (worke r s  on permanent  
immigrant visas) developed into an al ternat ive labor supply in relatively short order. 
Wh i'16 t h e  g r e e n  -cards  had  g r e a t e r  f o r m a l  p r o t e c t i o n  t h a n  t h e i r  b r a c e r o  
predecessors (largely in the formal - right to choose their  own employers)  , t hey  w e r e  
no t  the--only ' e n t r a n t s  i n t o  t h e  fields. A much h r g e r  lbophole appeared a s  
employers bemoaned the  loss of the braceros :  t h e  acces s ib i l i t y  of  undocumen ted  
---- .- 
workers. In-reality , t h e  bracero pbelirie was closed b u t  t he  undocumented floodgate 
was opened. With little at tent ion t o  border reguhtion in the  years  prior t o  1965, the  
Immigra t ion  a n d  Naturalization Service (INS) and i t s  police arm, the  Border Patrol, 
wereinsufficiently prepared for the massive influx of Mexican  na t iona l s  seeking  t o  
r e c a p t u r e  t h e  jobs t h e y  had occup ied  (or  s o u g h t  t o  acqui re)  as braceros. Some 
employers openly admit ted offering jobs t o  their former braceros once they saw the  
approach ing  d e m i s e  of  the  Bracero R o g r a m  (Thomas, 1981b: .Ch.5). Even with the 
infusion of tax dollars into the  INS budget (partially s t imula ted  by union lobbying), 
t he  Border Patrol- proved woefully inadequate in dealing with the  problein. Indeed, in 
light of the  history of Border P a t r o l  e f f o r t s  s i n c e  1965,  ' i t  would s e e m  t h a t ,  a s  
Burawoy (1976) and  o t h e r s  (e.g., Thomas ,  1981a and 1981b; and Bach, 1978) have 
argued, t h e  point has been t o  accentuate  the  political vulnerability of undocumented 
labor, no t  t o  a r r e s t  i t s  flow. 
T h e  e n d  of t h e  B r a c e r o  Program was not,  therefore,  a n  unmitigated blessing, 
Far from substantially reducing the  barriers to labor organizing, i t  c rea ted  newer and 
m o r e  f a r - r each ing  dileinmas: t h e  l ega l  'status of fa rm labor remained unchanged; 
Mexican labor was left in the fields; and undocumented w o r k e r s  c a m e  t o  occupy a 
distinct'ly' important,  and vulnerable, position in the  labor market. These were hardly 
auspicious circumstances for farm labor organizing, even with the  best intentions of a 
national liberal elite. 
An Urban Audience 
Dur ing  w h a t  we  r e f e r  t o  l a t e r  a s  t h e  "community organizing" phase (roughly 
f r o m  1963-67) o f  t h e  Uni ted  F a r m  Workers  union,  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  w a s  l e s s  
r e c o g n i z a b l e  as a trade union and more directly resembled a broader assemblage of 
fa rm warkers seeking to address a number of common needs. Though effor ts  t o  push 
f o r  c i v i l  r i g h t s  f o r  t h e  Mexican-American populat ion in the Southwest were being 
L - . -* - .= carried o h i n d  d a t a  back several decades, the movement in the  west was not nearly 
so well organized nor a s  visible' (especially t o  a national' audience) as the struggle of 
blacks in the south. The movement in t h e  Sou thwes t  had  b e e n  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by 
.-- 
largely i soh ted  campaigns to improve the  plight of farm workers sponsored by various 
c h u r c h  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  a n d  unions  b u t  usual ly depended  on t h e  he ro i c ,  b u t  often 
unsuccess f i l~e f fo r t s ,  of a handful of clergy and  union o r g a n i z e r s  ( c f  ., London and  
Anderson, 1970; G a k r z a ,  1971). 
O n e  of  t h e  f i r s t  major media investigations into the  situation of fa rm workers 
since the  Dust Bowl'era,  Edward R Murrow's. "Harvest o f  Shamew i n  1960 d i r e c t e d  
na t iona l '  a t t e n t i o n  t o  par t  of t he  --"other Americat' 'largely forgotten in the country's 
vigorous pursuit of affluence. While-"Harvest o f  Shamev1 quick ly  passed  i n t o  t h e  
m e m o r i e s  o f  many Amer i cans ,  t h e  f i lm awakened  o t h e r s ,  pa r t i cu l a r ly '  s t uden t s  
embarking on .a c r u s a d e  o f  c i v i l . r i g h t s  and a s e g m e n t  of t h e  c l e r g y  which had 
min i s t e r ing  t o  t h e  n e e d s  of  less rural flocks. Many students who would otherwise 
have headed south t o  par t ic ipate  in the  civi l ' r ights  movement s h i f t d  their a t tent ion 
from Selma t o  Salinas; others,  who gained experience in the  organizing techniques of 
southern boycot ts  and  m a r c h e s ,  rushed t o  Ca l i fo rn i a  t o  t a k e  p a r t .  P r i e s t s  and  
ministers lobbyed their their national' churches t o  c r ea t e  funds and ministries, such a s  
t he  ,Migrant Ministry, t o  reach migrant farm workers. The American Friends Service 
C o m m i t t e e ,  long a n  a d v o c a t e  of  f a r m  worker rights, established outposts in rural 
California seeking t o  provide infrastructure for the  movement. 
There, ahead of the  waves of students and clergy, a small but  enthusiastic cadre 
of organizers had established t h e  beginnings of a movement. Cesar Chavez, a former 
m i g r a n t  employed  as a n  o r g a n i z e r  f o r  t h e  Community Services Organization, had 
banded w e t h e r  with several . friends and relatives (including his wife ,  Helen,  cous in  
Manuel ,  b ro ther  Richard, and close friends Dolores Huerta and Fred Ross) t o  c r ea t e  
t h e  National-Farm Workers Association, t h e  precursor .  . t o  t h e  UFW. In t h e  e a r l y  - - - 4 - .  
1960s ,  t h e  NFWA was a looseh  knit  organization supported by Chavezts salary from 
the  CSO (an offshoot of Saul Alinsky's Industrial Areas Foundation based in chicago), 
Helen's and other's earnings and the  food and Clothes t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  r ece ived  in  
exchange for their services for farm workers. When ~ h a v e z  eventual ly quit  the CSQ 
--in large part ,  he argues, because the  CSO was no more committed t o  tackling the  
immense problems of organizing farm workers than had been the  AFL-CIO-the NFWA 
lived largely off t h e  occasional 'dues i t  received from i t s  members and  c h a r i t y  (cf., 
Levy, 1975; Taylor, 1975). 
Yet,  Chavez had a surplus of energy and a growing reputation' among the  farm 
workers with whom he  came  into contact.  Up and down the vast  San Joaquin Valley, 
th rough t h e  r a d i a n t  vineyards and orchards which a r e  the  state 's livelihood, Chavez 
made human contac t  with his future cons t i t uency :  a c o n t a c t  which among  many 
s t i m u l a t e d  such e n t h u s i a s m  tha t  even before the  union's first  successes there were 
some who called themselves--"ChavistasV' (fol lowers  of Chavez) .  Chavez ' s  Style  o f  
o rgan iz ing  b r o k e  t h e  r u l e s  o f  t r a d e  union organizing: he  insisted on the  need to  
establish common bonds of sdlidarity among the farm workers before even considering 
hunching a s tr ike (Friedland and Thomas, 1974). Migrant workers had everything to  
lose from being ushered too  quickly into a strike; t he  pas t  h i s to ry  of  f a r m  worke r  
o r g a n i z a t i o n  in t h e  S o u t h w e s t  w a s  r e p l e t e  with story a f t e r  story of strikes being 
quashed quickly a n d  easily by a well-organized industry.  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  a s  Chavez  
-- 
reasoned, campesinos had every right t o  b e  suspicious of outsiders-incliiding himself- 
because every contac t  they had with the  local 'community, especially Anglo landlords, 
shop owners, police, and vigilantes, reaffirmed the  cos t  of being Mexican or Mexican- 
A m e r i c a r a n d  a farm worker. Chavez, though a Mexican-American, was suspect if he 
t a l k e d  o r  a c t e d  l i ke  a union o rgan ize r ;  union organizers  had proven themselves 
- -- LLI 
1 3 F g S l y i - f u l - w h e n  it c a m e  t o  doing some th ing  -about - -wages  a n d  w o r k i n g  
cond i t i ons  in t h e  fiel'ds. Thus, C h a v e z  saw t h e  NFWA a s  a self-help community 
o r g a n i z a t i o n  of f a r m  w o r k e r s  and vigorously r e j e c t e d  t r a d i t i o n a l '  t r a d e  u n i o n  
strategies.  
T h e  e a r l y  succes ses  of t h e  NFWA (described i n - a  k t e r  section) provided some 
indication to Chavez t h a t  this s ta tegy was indeed correct.  Farm worke r s  could  b e  
b r o u g h t  t o g e t h e r  t o  deve lop  common means t o  satisfy common needs (e.g., with a 
cooperative gas station, burial-insurance and a cred i t  union). These advantages were 
of ten  tenuous, dependent on the  willingness of t he  NFWA members to  continue in the 
f a c e  o f  g r e a t  odds ,  b u t  w e r e  r e a l  enough t o  c o n v i n c e  C h a v e z  t o  g u a r d  t h e  
o r g a n i t a t o n  a g a i n s t  p r e m a t u r e  e f f o r t s  t o  unionize  and  t o  continue t o  asser t  his 
particular strategy of  organization. Since t h e  m o v e m e n t ,  a t  t h i s  s t a g e  at l e a s t ,  
depended  on t h e  herculean ef for t s  of Chavez a s  leader, his desire t o  asser t  control 
o v e r  o rgan iz ing  s t r a t e g y  a n d  t o  k e e p ' h i s  f i nge r  in a l l  a c t i v i t i e s  w a s  l a r g e l y  
unchallenged. 
Howe.ver, t h e  inf lux of a new wave  of " o u t s i d e r s " ~  d id  pose a challenge t o  
Chavez's command. The troops of clergy and s tudents  (which a c t u a l l y  began  m o r e  
like a f e w .  scouts) arrived in California determined t o  do  what they could to alleviate 
t he  plight of t h e  farm workers. One early arrival 'described his entrance this 
way: "I c a m e  on a b u s  from Philadelphia with a couple friends in the  summer of 
1964. We got  into Fresno and headed for the  American Friends Office looking to 'see 
w h a t  we  cou ld '  do  t o  he lp  t h e  far.m workers. Pd spent t he  preceeding summer in 
Mississippi, and figured we'd just come into town a n d  set th ings  up. You know, a 
march, maybe a boycott  or something. We had p h n s  and thought we'd pret ty  much 
have to% i t  ourselves..because the farm workers didn't have the experience we didn 
(interview with former UFW staff member, October, 1978). Others, like the student 
-- -- - -  
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above, also believed they would have to--"buildn the  farm workerst movement. Many, 
d i r e c t e d  t o  the  NFWA through 'the AFSC and others  aware  of Chavez's organization 
were confronted by a sinall core  of NFWA organizers suspicious of t he i r  in ten t ions .  
While it would b e  too e x t r e m e  t o  sugges t  t h a t  C h a v e z  and  t h e  o t h e r s  jealously 
guarded their  creation, i t  is t rue  t h a t  they tended to -resist the implication tha t  they 
needed guidance in their endeavor. One ea r ly  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  NFWA and  a c l o s e  
associate of Chavez during tha t  t ime exphined .- -. t h a t  there was real 'concern a s  
to how t h e  organization would deal  with the influx of Anglos, particularly young men 
a n d  women,  many of  whom f e l t '  t h e y  knew b e t t e r  how t o  do  t h e  job than the  
indigenous organizers (Personal communication, June, 197 1). 
While- this  volunteer labor force clearly posed problems, i t  also offered benefits 
t h e  NFWA sorely needed. Students and clergy provided a r e l a t i e l l  good S U P P ~ Y  o f  
c h e a p ,  en thus ias t ic  and skilled labor. C ~ l l e g e  s tudents  could b e  enlisted t o  perform 
myriad chores: sett ing up communication channkb with local press, making  sense  of  
t he  increasingly complex books and accounts, doing the  necessary b u t  of ten distasteful 
(or at least  boring) jobs of mimeographing, phoning, researching, cooking and cleaning. 
Many s t u d e n t s  c a m e  f r o m  urban  a r e a s  ou t s ide  t h e  state and thus were potential  
conduits of information about the  NFWA to  urban audiences and links with financial 
r e s o u r c e s  a n d  o t h e r  s t u d e n t s  back  t o  the organization. Ministers, priests and nuns 
could lobby their  own church hierarchies for funds and publicity. They commanded  
r e s p e c t  f r o m  loca l '  po l i t i cans  ( a t  l e a s t  in i t ia l ly)  a n d  often prevailed upon liberal 
members  of loca l ' e l i t es  to plead t h e i r  case in f r o n t  o f  c i t y  counc i l s  and  coun ty  
b o a r d s  o f  commiss ione r s .  They could '  a l s o  b e  q u i t e  e f f e c t i v e  in leaning on the  
growing bureaucratic apparatuses of Community Action Boards being set up under :$he 
auspice- t h e  war on Poverty. Finally, as Chavez found .when he  began his tour of 
c o l l e g e  c a m p u s e s  in  1965,  s t u d e n t s  (and t o  a l e s s e r  e x t e n t ,  c l e r g y )  w e r e  a 
- - - --repleriishableEl&bor source. Those who le f t  the  NFWA to pursue their studies (or who 
were exhausted from the regimen Chavez established) w e r e  of  t e n  r e p l a c e d  by ha l f  
again as many others. 
Chavez marshalled his supporters in the fields into a t i g h t  c o r e  o f  o r g a n i z e r s  
and, in an  e f fo r t  t o  asser t  his leadership whi le  capitalizing on t h e  supply of outsiders, 
steadfastly refused t o  accept  ex terna l~ass i s tance  unless i t  was on his and t h e  NFWA's 
terms. "It was going t o  b e  a farm workers' movement o r  nobody's movement a s  fa r  
as Cesar was concerned,"Chavez's associate argued.  - And, f a i r l y  quick ly ,  t h e  
i ssue  w a s  reso lved  : volunteers, though they might disagree vehemently with Chavez 
and his s t r a t e g i e s ,  w e r e  none the l e s s  impressed  wi th  t h e  c o m m i t m e n t  of  NFWA 
members and s taff  t o  Chavez, t o  t he  record of  success already established and t o  the  
discipline which Chavez instilled in t h e  ranks of the membership. Furthermore, a s  a 
number  found o u t ,  Chavez  w a s  n o t  unwil l ing,  t o  s w i f t l y  d i scha rge  r e c r u i t s  who 
disobeyed orders or too frequently questioned commands. An important ,  though n o t  
directly obvious factor ,  also resolved the issue of leadership: most ~ > f  t he  volunteers 
cou ld  n o t  speak  Spanish,  much l e s s  quickljl a s s i m i l a t e  i n t o  t h e  c u l t u r e  of t h e  
. p r e d o m i n a n t l y  Mexican membersh ip .  Hence,  t h e i r  s t a t u s  as o u t s i d e r s  f u r t h e r  
diminished their capacity to  lead. 
Having reso lved  t h e  d i le inma of how t o  incorporate a potentially divisive but  
u s e f u l .  s o u r c e  o f  ene rgy ,  C h a v e z  a n d  t h e  NFWA t h e n  p r o c e e d e d  t o  u n d e r t a k e  
organization of a sympathetic urban audience. With a supply- of volunteer k b o r  well- 
- connected to outside groups, there  would be  no diversion of  funds  o r  r e s o u r c e s  t o  
o t h e r ,  non-farm worke r  organizations. Conversely, t h e  t i e s  between volunteers and 
those outside groups could be strengthened and extended to serve the  purposes of .the 
f a r m  warkers '  a s soc i a t ion .  In o t h e r  words, not only could students and clergy do 
what needed to b e  done in the  fields and rural ' communities, bu t  they could become 
- t h e  organizers--of-- that  d i f fuse  u rban  audience .  - --This i s - - n o  small  point given the  
- 
insistence by Jenkins and  Perrow (1977) tha t  the national liberal e l i te  made possible 
the  success of the  UFW. In fac t ,  as civil rights organizers in t he  south had aliady 
discovered (cf, Morris, forthcoming), waiting for urban liberals in the industrial - north 
t o  -"tescue': the  oppressed netted only a bnger  period of oppression! The point was 
tha t  tha t  audience had t o  be  organized, to be  d i r e c t e d  in how t o  a s s i s t  s t ruggles  
outs ide  t h e  suburbs  and the  shoreliries. Just as southern civil rights leaders turned 
white students back t o  t h e  north t o  organize  the i r  own-. "backyards," so Chavez 
u l t ima te ly '  s e n t  s t u d e n t s  and clergy back to the  ci t ies  t o  lead the  national liberal 
elite,  e.g., in the later boycott campaigns. 
Thus, t h e  e f f o r t s  of l ibera l  legislators and union leaders, while stemming the 
t ide of braceros into California fields, provided something of  a s t e p  in the  r igh t  
d i rec t ion .  And, students and clergy certainly' arrived at a propitious point in time. 
But, the  termination of the  Bracero Program and the infusion of volunteer labor were 
not  unmi t iga ted  blessings. They had to be  bent to  serve the purpose of the local 
organization; but they did not make the l o d l  'organization. Thus, while i t  would be 
incorrect t o  ignore political- and ideological changes taking place at the  national level, 
those changes provide only a partial.explanation for why fa rm worker unionization 
finally' achieved success. 
To this millieu must b e  added another fa&or which has largely been left aside 
until now: s t ruc ju ra l ' change  in t h e  economic  organiza t ion  of ag r i cu l tu re  in t h e  
-- 
Southwest. Here, again, we will' point t o  an -important pre-condition to  organization: 
as before, a .necessary but insufficient source of explanation. 
Structural Change in Agriculhre 
L o x - t e r m  changes  in t h e  pol i t ica l  economy of agriculfural- production in the 
southwestern United States significantv altered the environment in which farm worker 
u n i o n s  o r g Z n i z e d 3 w o  g e n e r a l  sets of  changes  -are r e l e v a n t  to-:the .:anaJysis:- - - . .. 
concentration in production . (particulirly in what had traditionally been labor-intensive 
c r o p s )  and changes  in t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of  t h e  e n t e r p r i s e s  engaged in ag r i cu l tu ra l  
production. fn some cases, a s  we will a t tempt  t o  show, those changes resulted in an 
a l t e r a t i o n  of  the  hbor  process in production; in others, organizational' changes more 
directly effected the  susceptabiiity/vulnerability of enterprises t o  challenges by f a r m  
workers for union representation. 
To detail t h e  extent of change in agricultural production in the  southwest is far  
beyond the scope of this paper; however, i t  is necessary to consider t h e  process  o f  
concen t ra t ion  of  production in t h e  period (roughly) from 1930-1975. As Fellmeth 
(1973), Villarejo (1980), Fredericks (1 9781, High t o w e r  (19731, Zwerdling (1980) and 
others have documented, California agriculture has historically led the nation in terms 
of size of production units, percentage of fresh and processed fruits and vegetables, 
and corpora te  ownership of land and product. During the period of 1930-1975, the  
production of major f r u i t  and vege tab le  c rops  s teadi ly  increased in volume b u t  
dec reased  in t o t a l  production units ;  a s  more  was  being grown, fewer firms were 
growing crops. Although few precise figures a re  available to  document the  process of 
concen t ra t ion ,  a few examples  provide evidence: prior . t o  1960, nearly' 4000 farms 
produced tomatoes  for  processing,  by 1974, however,  less  t h a n  600 f a r m s  g r e w  
t o m a t o e s  (even though t o t a l  production had increased significantly) (Friedland and 
Barton, 1975); in 1940, the three largest le t tuce  growers accounted for less than 20% 
of all the  lettuce produced in California and Arizona, by 1978, however the  top three 
produced nearly 50% (with individual-contributions reaching nearly 40% at some poin'ts 
during t h e  year)  (Friedland, Barton and Thomas, 1981; Thomas, 1981); in the 1940s, 
ci t rus pmduction in California was carried out on several ' thousand smal l  f a rms ,  by 
t h e  mid 1970s, however, less than 8% of all ci t rus producers accounted for 47% of 
-- - - 
t he  crop (Valvano, 1981:3); in the  wine and table grape industries, s imilar  processes  
w e r e  taking place (Friedhind, forthcoming; and Moskowitz, Katz and Levering, 1980: 
806-7). In segments of agriculture directly adjacent t o  production such as processing, 
distilling, canning and brewing, processes of concentration were  steadily reducing the  
number  o f  f i rms  and, not  surprisingly, t he  degree of competi t ion amongst consumers 
of - ltiaw materials" from agricultural enterprises (cf., Frundt, 1981). 
Many o f  t h e  b igge r  f i r m s  engaged in agricultural production had roots in the  
more successful 'competi tors  who had survived the  depression; many others,  however ,  
c a m e  i n  f r o m  t h e  "outs idew -in t h e  much-publicized c o r p o r a t e  p e n e t r a t i o n  of 
agricul ture  during the  decades of the  1950s and 1960s. Companies like Tenneco (wine 
grapes, cot ton,  assorted vegetables), Santa Fe    and Company (grapes, cotton), United 
Brands (lettuce, mixed vegetables), Purex ( l e t t u c e ) ,  Coca-Cola  ( c i t r u s ,  g r a p e s  and  
wine), Schenley , Heublein, and National Distillers (wine and brandy) joined large local 
firms l i ke  Bud-Antle ( le t tuce and vegetables), Gallo (wine)  Almaden (wine),  Maggio 
(vegetables) and DtArrigo (vegetables) t o  significantly change the  organizational. shape 
of California ag r i cu l tu re .  With t h e  g r o w t h  o f  e x t e n s i v e  a n d  du rab le  m a r k e t i n g  ' 
n e t w o r k s ,  l i nkages  t o  key  chemical and ferti l izer producers, vast  agglomerations of 
land and production capital ,  and advances in production technique, the costs  of doing 
bus ines s  skyrocketed,  t h e  market position of smaller f i rms fur ther  marginalized, and 
the  sophistication o f  production technology intensified. 
A t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e  tha t  corporate agriculture expanded i t s  share of production, 
many ' large . f i rms  sough t  t o  e s t ab l i sh  and  expand  t h e i r  m a r k e t  pos i t ion  through 
a g g r e s s i v e  adve r t i s ing .  Major processing firms like Cmntadina, Hunt-Wesson, Heinz, 
Libby's, Callo, Almaden, Christian Brothers, Campbells and others  a t t empted  t o  bo th  
f ix  t h e h a m e s  in  t h e  publ ic  mind and  t o  up t h e  a n t e  for entry into the  highly 
lucrative processing and distilling industry (NACLA, 1976; a n d  F rund t  , 198 1 ). O t h e r  
4 
- -  firm3-, such  as Bud-Antle,  a t t e m p t e d  t o  c r e a t e  brand-name indent i f ica t ion  with 
consumers by putting their company logo on the  plastic wrapper found on le t tuce in 
the  supermarket (Fredericks, 1979); Sunkist expanded the  use of ink dyes on the  skins 
of their oranges and lemons to cement  a consumer association between the brandname 
and product  quality. 
\ These changes in the  political economy of agriculbjral  produc t i o n ~ o n c e n t r a  tion, 
corporate  penetration and brand-name advertising--each changed the s tage upon which 
t h e  s t r u g g l e  be tween agricultural labor and capi tal  struggled. The concentration of 
production reduced  t h e  number  of  f i r m s  in c o m p e t i t i o n  b u t ,  a t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e ,  
b rough t  a b o u t  a c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o f  people- in production. The larger firms came  t o  
account for a larger percentage of the man-hours'of labor performed in t h e  f ie lds .  
As a c o n s e q u e n c e ,  t he  personal relations between employer and employee tended to  
be  eroded in the  face  of a much larger hbor  force. Even though labor contractors  
continued t o  b e  employed by cer tain firms, they themselves came  t o  b e  subjected t o  
a much more standardized routine and t reated a s  extensions of the company,  r a t h e r  
t h a n  i n d e p e n d e n t  en t r ep reneur s .  Increasingly, companies found i t  more rational (if 
only in b u d g e t a r y  t e rms)  t o  d i r e c t l y  handle  t h e i r  own e m p l o y m e n t  a n d  l a b o r  
r e c r u i t i n g ,  t h u s  removing  t h e  middleman labor cont rac tor  altogether (cf., Thomas 
1981: Chapter  5). One major upshot of the concentration of product ion ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  
w a s  t h e  de-personalization of employment relations and t h e  agglomeration of larger 
numbers of workers within the  same organization. 
C o r p o r a t e  penetration into agriculture brought with it firms with experience in 
labor relations in union-dominated industries, many of which were outside agriculture. 
Surely one of t he  hies into agriculture was the kick of an  organiied labor movement, 
:yet,  conhon ted  with a challenge from labor ( a s  many w e r e  in t h e  l a t e  1960s a n d  
e a r l y  1970s)  m o r e  were willirig to seek an accomodation with labor (commonly' with 
4 
f he- Teamsters,  union)-- than f ace  a protracted union-busting-effort. - LA -wil l ingness-=to =--= - = =  - - 7 -  
deal '  with labor unions resulted also from the  diversity of economic activities in which 
mos t  c o r p o r a t e  e n t e r p r i s e s  w e r e  engaged .  S ince  many w e r e  s i t u a t e d  in o t h e r  
industries besides agriculture and based their p r o f i t a b i l i t y  o n  o t h e r  p roduc t s ,  t hey  
w e r e  in a b e t t e r  pos i t ion  t o  w e a t h e r  t h e  v a g a r i e s  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  production in 
general--whether t h a t  meant  oscillations in weather, marke t  p r i c e s  o r  ' l abor  unions. 
However ,  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  in  o t h e r  p r o d u c t  l ines  did n o t  b r ing  wi th  i t  a complete  
guarantee of irivulnerability; firms like Coca-Cola (Coke, Minute  aid), United Brands 
(Ch iqu i t a  Bananas) ,  Heublein (Smirnoff  Vodka), Seagrams (seagramts 7 ,  VO), Purex 
. (Bleach) and National Distillers (GiJbeyls Gin, Old Grand-dad)  a l l  banked  on o t h e r  
consumer i tems as their  principal profit  centers. The high visibility of these main- 
line products and their centrali ty t o  corpora te  p r o f i t s  a l s o  m a d e  t h e m  po ten t i a l l y  
suxep tab le '  t o  "negative" brand-name .identification, largely- in the form of organized 
consumer boycotts. 
Thus, f a r  beyond t h e  s o c i a l  a n d  po l i t i ca l  m a c h i n a t i o n s  o f  n a t i o n a l  ' e l i t e s ,  
important changes were taking p h c e  at the  level of t h e  enterprise  and the  workphce. 
Despite the  significance of outside sympathy and help, the  construction of a durable 
f a rm workers movement cannot b e  le f t  ou t  of the analysis. Most importantly, as we 
have tried t o  show, changes in the  s t ructure of agr icu l tura l  ' produc t ion  c o n t r i b u t e d  
subs tan t ia l ly .  t o  t h e  preconditions for success. To understand how the  United Farm 
Workers union w a s  fo rged  o u t  o f  a n  i n t e r a c t i o n  w i t h  t h e s e  changes ,  i t  is now 
necessary t o  look directly'  at the  organization itself. 
From Mobilization to Mechanization 
Three overlapping phases in t he  construction of t h e  United Farm Workers union 
can be  distinguished: "community organizing" (1963-67); "union buildingn (1967-73); and 
"union expansion" (1973-82). Each  o f  t h e s e  p h a s e s  is m a r k e t  by d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l '  deve lopmen t  and s tructure and, no t  surprisingly, by different sets of 
problems. They are linked, however, by a set of internal-  conflicts brought about by 
the  s t ruc ture  confronting .the movement itself. One general problem confronting the  
m o v e m e n t  f r o m  its e a r l i e s t  phase  through t h e  latest i s  t h e  c o n f l i c t  b e t w e e n  
- 
c o m m u n a l  -o rgan iza t ion ,  w h e t h e r  a round  e t h n i c i t y  o r  c l a s s ,  a n d  t h e  seemingly-  
everpresent  need t o  deve lop  an  i n t e r n a l  ' h i e r a r c h y  t o  d e a l .  with t h e  increas ingly  
complex nature of cont rac t  negotiation and administration. The conflict  internally' has 
been a particularly virulent one precisely as a ~ s e l t  of t he  heavy emphasis given by 
union l e a d e r s  in t h e  e a r l y  phase on the  communal' nature of the  organization, thus  
lending a social .movement flavor t o  t h e  union's e f fo r t s  (especially in creat ing linkages 
t o  o u t s i d e  L a t i n o  and  Chicano organizations and in defining the oppression of farm 
workers with the  discrimination against Hispanic-Americans in general). Yet, with the  
success of t he  union in acquiring a rek t ive ly  stable existence in agriculture, pressures 
have ,continued t o  mount from both employers and members compelling the union t o  
bureaucrat ize the administration of cont rac ts  and the  often complex benefit  programs 
which those cont rac ts  have brought about. Thus, the  union confronts the dilemma of 
how t o  s e r v i c e .  i t s  c o n t r a c t  p a r t n e r s  a n d  i t s  m e m b e r s  w i thou t  allowing for t he  
creat ion of a rigid bureaucracy-especially one which could  d i s t a n c e  t h e  ' l e a d e r s h i p  
f r o m  t h e  membersh ip  in a fashion reminiscent of developments in other American 
t r ade  unions. 
T h e a t h e r  major  problem concerns t h e  union's capacity to  susta rganizational .b 
growth, increased wages and benefits, and more e f fec t ive  protection of farm workers' 
- ---_- - 
i n t e r e s t s  w i th in  a pol i t ica l ly-media ted  labor  m a r k e t .  As suggested earlier,  t h e  
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conditions of employment in much of industiral ' agriculture are themselves fue l ed  by 
t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  po l i t ica l ly  vulrierable- labor, especially undocumented immigrants 
from Mexico, C e n t e l ' a n d  South America. The UFW's organizational' strategies have 
g e n e r a l l y  been  d i r e c t e d  toward mobilization of rek t ive ly '  stable' (geographically and 
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l l y )  workers ,  t h e  m a j o r i t y  of  whom h a v e  b e e n  e i t h e r  c i t i z e n s  o r  
d o c u m e n t e d  immigran t s .  However, in many crops (including those most extensive&. 
organized by the  union) a significant proportion of the  labor force is undocumented .  
In t he  le t tuce industry, for example, es t imates  of nearly- one-third of t he  hbor  force 
being undocumented a r e  common (cf., Thomas ,  198  1: C h a p t e r  3). In o t h e r  c rop -  
i ndus t r i e s ,  such  as s t r a w b e r r i e s ,  e s t i m a t e s  a s  t o  the  percentage of undocumented 
workers is even higher. For the UFW, the presence of undocumented worke r s  i s  a 
major problein: 'indocumentados tend t o  b e  the  most easily manipulated workers; they 
are of ten  forced t o  accept  wages and/or working conditions far  be low union leve ls ;  
a n d  t h e y  a r e  ava i l ab l e '  in l a r g e  supply t o  b e  used as strikebreakers. Despite the 
sent iment  found among many undocumented workers t h a t  unionization is necessary for 
f a rm workers, t h e  contingencies of employment and the needs of families living in 
pover ty  in Mexico o f t e n  outweigh  s y m p a t h i e s  f o r  t h e  UFW and unioniza t ion  in 
g e n e r a  1- ( T h o m a s ,  198 1b: Ch.5). Y e t ,  if t h e  ava i l ab i l i t y  and  vu lne rab i l i t y  of 
u n d o c u m e n t e d  worke r s  a c t s  t o  k e e p  -wages low,  working cond i t i ons  p h y s i c a l l y  
destruct ive and employment security negligible, i t  also a c t s  t o  sustain employment for 
union members. In lieu of sufficiently entrenched organization t o  negotiate .the t e rms  
o f  e m p l o y m e n t  o r ,  shou'ld i t  p rove  necessary, t o  ex t r ac t  a compensation/retraining 
program for workers displaced by mechanization, t h e  UFW walks  a t i g h t r o p e  wi th  
r e s p e c t  t h e  issue of undocumented workers. ~ndocumentados effectively'  undercut 
t he  union's ability tn cont ro l ' the  supply of labor and deepen o rgan iza t ion ;  y e t ,  t h e  
-- presence-of Tn-documentados acts, ironically, t o  allay mechanization, job displacement 
and, u l t i m a t e v ,  diminution of the  union itself. 
In the  section which follows, t h e  three  historical phases in t he  development of 
t he  United Farm Workers union wi l l  b e  d iscussed .  In t h i s  p r e s e n t a t i o n ,  w e  wil l  
a t t e m p t  to lirik t he  process of union development a n d - t h e  problems which the union 
has  encountered in organizatian with the s t ruc tura l -  character is t ics  of the  agricultural 
l abor  m a r k e t  a n d  industry.  In t h e  concluding  section, we will turn t o  t he  more 
general  - implications of t he  overall analysis. 
The Community Organizing Phase: 1963-67 
The remarkable success of Cesar Chavez and the  core  organizers of the UFW in 
creat ing a durable farm worker movement is noteworthy not only in light of the  past 
history of  violent but failed a t t empt s  at agricultural unionism b u t  a l s o  in t e r m s  of  
t h e  s t r a t e g y  of organization they employed. From the outset  in 1962 when serious 
e f f o r t s  t o  build a f a r m  worke r s  o rgan iza t ion  began ,  C h a v e z  worked in a s t y l e  
d i s t i n c t l y  d i f f e r e n t  f rom t r a d i t i o n a l  f a c t o r y  l abo r  organizing.  Using community 
organizing techniques he acquired from Alinsky organizer Fred Ross (then working for  
t h e  Communi ty  Service Organiztion-CSO), Chavez applied an approach which, while' 
sharing :similarities t o  Alinsky's, represented a new departure in community organizing. 
Alinsky's key  t e c h n i q u e s  involved t h e  development  of strong commitments by the 
receiving community, the  creation of a coalition of organizations and  Alinsky's own 
< 
abrasive presence t o  serve as a catalyst  in pohrizing t h e  community. 
Chavez's approach was dis t inctw d i f f e ren t .  Although h e  t a r g e t e d  p a r t i c u l a r  
c o m m u n i t i e s  of  f a r m  workers (a  point of g rea t  importance t o  which wewill return), 
Chavez re turned  as a f a r m  l a b o r e r  and  b e g a n  q u i e t ,  unob t rus ive  o rgan iza t iona l  
activitie-nstead of  arriving as an  organizer. Chavez correctly recognized tha t  any 
a t t e m p t  t o  become involved in economic actions/challenges t o  growers would be  m e t  
w i 3 h - t  h-e same-+lacable  hos t i l i t y  which had  spe l led  d o o m - - t o - p r e v i o u s  - l abo r - - -  
. - 
offensives. His upbringing in a migrant farm worker family alSo aler ted him to the  
suspic ion  f a r m  worke r s  who o f t e n  lived a precarious existence harbored for labor 
organizers from-'butside." n u s ,  economic act ion against e m p l o y e r s  wou'ld have  t o  
w a i t  u n t i l  ' t h e  b o n d s  of so l ida r i t y  b e t w e e n  t h e  c o r e  o f  f a r m  worke r s  in t h e  
organization were strong. To avoid p r e m a t u r e  c o n t r o v e r s y ,  C h a v e z  e schewed  t h e  
t e r m  "union!'.in naming  t h e  organiztion ( the  National Farm Workers Association or 
NFWA); t o  have done so would have al tered a g r i c u l t u ~ l ~ e r i ? p l o y e r s  t o  .what was  t o  
emerge,  a l l  t oo  soon, as a cancer  from their point of view. 
More important than the  naming of t he  organization, Chavez sought in his initial 
undertaking to define the  kinds of services t h a t  relatively isolated and individualized 
farm worker families needed and then began t o  develop t h o s e  s e r v i c e s  through h i s  
own energies. Most of t he  farm workers with whom he  dea l t  drove their own cars  t o  
t he  s i te  of t h e i r  s e a s o n a l -  work--most w e r e  no t ,  in f a c t ,  m i g r a n t s  b u t  t r a v e l e d  
c o n s i d e r a b l e  distances t o  their work daily, in most cases  within a 25-50 mile- radius 
of  their home. What they needed, therefore,  w a s  c h e a p  gas ,  o i l  and  c a r  r epa i r s .  
F r o m  t h e s e  n e e d s ,  C h a v e z  worked t o  deve lop  t h e  f a r m  workers' cooperative gas 
station. Similarly, due to the seasonal-nature of t h e i r  work and  t h e  r a t h e r  harsh  
t r e a t m e n t  many  r e c e i v e d  a t  t h e  hands  of  t h e  pub l i c  w e l f a r e  bureaucracy, fa rm 
,workers had t o  borrow money during t h e  s l ack  season.  Tradi t iona l ly ,  money w a s  
bo r rowed  f r o m  loan sharks; Chavez worked t o  develop a farm workerst credi t  union. 
And finally, though this does not exhaust the range of farm worker needs, most farm 
workers kicked t h e  savings to provide for a crucial  family.need: burial. (This is not 
to overl6ok the  f a c t  t ha t  few workers had medical-insurance t o  cover even the most 
r u d i m e n k r y  h e a l t h  requirements.)  In order t o  meet  t h a t  expense, Chavez and the  
small  cadre  of NFWA staff  f o r m u l a t e d  a bu r i a l  i n su rance  p r o g r a m  based  on t h e  
L collection of -small_premiums from a h r g e  number -of. subscribers. ...----.- - . . . . -.-. . - - . - 
By serving genuine needs and developing organizations within which farm workers 
could  deve lop  t r u s t  in one another, Chavez and the  founders of t he  NFWA crea ted  
t h e  means by which to impart  organizhg skills. These several-  e f for t s  c rea ted  bonds 
o f  solidarity betwken workers which then became centered in t he  NFWA. 
The community organiz ing  phase  of  t h e  NFWA w a s  t h u s  a per iod  in which 
Chavez and t h e  core  cadre  of organizers a t t empted  to  c r ea t e  reciprocal bonds among 
f a r m  workers .  I t  w a s  a per iod  in which t h e  o r g a n i z e r s  t r a v e l e d  e x t e n s i v e l y  
t h r o u g h o u t  California acquainting themselves with farm workers in a human fashion, 
gaining access through personal 'contact to  the  grapevines which 'linked workers to one 
a n o t h e r  a n d  t o  employers, and using those grapevines t o  broadcast their message of 
action. With each stop in a farm worker community o r  barrio, organizational ' seeds 
w e r e  p l a n t e d ,  l o c a l  c o n t a c t s  made  a n d  s t r e n g t h e n e d  a n d  more  e x t e n s i v e  bonds 
developed. The extensive traveling which Chavez himself undertook, of ten leaving his 
home base in t he  rural community of Delano in t he  southern San Jaaquin Valley for 
w e e k s  a t  a t i m e ,  was  commonly  fue l ed  by c o n t r i b u t i o n s  f rom f a m i l i e s  in t h e  
c o m m u n i t i e s  h e  visited. His visibility during this  period proved important later for 
t he  strong t ies  of commitment which helped the  organizat ion surv ive  a t t a c k s  f r o m  
employers and their police enforcers. 
What has  been described here as a community organizing strategy tells only. par t  
of t he  story behind. the initial successes of the  NFWA. Overlooked in many of t he  
more macro-analyses of farm worker insurgency has  been the  significance of w& was . 
being organized. That is, while among the  resources at the  organization's c o m m a n d  
(or acquired a s  i t  grew) included external.  sources of financial and manpower support, 
na t iona l ' pb l i c i t y ,  and a more hospitable reception in urban  a r e a s ,  l oca l  r e sou rces  
w e r e  a l s o  c r i t i c a l  p a r t s  o f  t h e  s tory .  Loca l  soc i a l ,  f a m i l i a l '  a n d  informational 
networks predated the  e f for t s  of the  NFWA a n d  C h a v e z  and  w e r e  . . themselves  t h e  
Product of a n  historically constructed system of production and labor recruitment.  In 
other  words, t he  movement which C h a v e z  i n i t i a t e d  was  founded upon p reex i s t i ng  
resources which were purposively redirected to serve the  needs of farm workers in a 
collective fashion. 
A reexaminat ion  of t h e  f irs t  organizational-efforts undertaken by Chavez and 
the  NFWA is instructive in t h i s  regard.  The f i r s t  s y s t e m a t i c  and c o n c e n t r a t e d  
organizing efforts were directed toward farm workers in an area  surrounding Delano, 
California. Delano is a community located at the  southern end of t h e  San Joaquin 
Valley (often referred to  a s  the  Central Valley) in Kern County. The area is a rich 
source of fruits and vegetables but is overwhelmingly dedicated to the production of 
t a b l e -  and wine g rapes  and,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  grape industry constitutes the  principal 
source of employment for farm workers in the area. In addition to the concentration , , 
of  product ion  and employment, grape harvesting and vine-pruning offer employment 
over relat ively l6ng periods of time. Unlike, for example, the  flash-peak of harvest 
employment in the  tomato or strawberry harvests, work in the  grape harvest has been 
extended both as a result of the proliferation o f  g r a p e  va r i e t a l s  which produce a 
s t a g g e r e d  ha rves t  (allowing producers t o  stagger the marketing or delivery of their 
crops) and as a resu'lt of the 'concentration of production within an area suitable for 
commuting on a daily' basis from a centrally-located home base. The availability of 
work, f i rs t  in the harvest, then the meticulous process  of pruning back exhausted  
vines and finally in other phases of production (e.g., weeding) or in other crops, made 
it possible for some workers to settle in 'local communities such a s  Delano and find 
e m p l o y m e n t  fo r  t h e  bull< of the  year. This is not t o  argue that  all grape workers 
were d r m  from 'local labor pools; up un t i l ' t he  end of t h e  Bracero  Program,  t h e  
majority of the labor force was drawn from Mexico under the  contract provisions of 
t h a t  system of--"managed migrationw (Galarza, 1964). 
It was, however, this relatively stable segment of the labor force which Chavez 
a t t e m p t e d  t o  organize.  S tabi l i ty ,  as we a rgued  ea r l i e r ,  was a key f a c t o r  in 
organizing. Grape workers (those who were not  braceros) tended t o  b e  geographically 
a n d  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l l y  s t ab l e .  For  t h e  m o s t  pa r t , -  work  in t h e  g r a p e  indus t ry  
c o n s t i t u t e d  t h e i r  ma jo r  s o u r c e  of income.  Many had  d e v e l o p e d  a d e g r e e  o f  
s p e c i a l i z a t i o n  in  t h e  work--a specialization which heQed to increase their earnings 
potent ial  under a piece-rate sysytem of  payment and which involved the  ent i re  family 
in d i f f e r e n t  p h a s e s  o f  t h e  h a r v e s t  as a u n i t  ( s o m e  cut t ing,  some picking up the  
bunched of grapes and others  packing them in c r a t e s  in the  case of t he  table grape 
harvest;  in t he  wine grape harvest, some cutting, others  tossing the  c u t  bunches into 
wire cages called and one or two driving the  small t ractor  which pulled the  
gondolas). Organizational stability came about  a s  a result -of  t he  informal. t i es  linking 
worke r s  t o  p a r t i c u l a r  o r  r egu la r  e m p l o y e r s ,  f o r e m e n  o r  l abo r  c o n t r a c t o r s  and ,  
r e f l e c t i n g  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  economy of  t h e  indus t ry ,  t h e  relatively- small number of 
employers  ( s ince  t h e  indus t ry  was  d o m i n a t e d  by l a r g e  compan ie s ,  winer ies  and  
I _  b rokers ) .  For  many of  t h e s e  workers, migration in search of work was extremely 
limited and of ten  consisted m o r e  in long-d is tance  c o m m u t i n g  b e t w e e n  home a n d  
various work sites. Again, given the  nature of t h e  work process and the  structure of 
t he  industry, migration and commuting generally took the  form of fami ly  movemen t  
o r  -crew movement, ra ther  than the  migration of single men over long distances. 
. - 
Combined ,  w i th  t h e  o rgan iza t iona l .  p o t e n t i a l .  i n h e r e n t  in g e o g r a p h i c a l -  a n d  
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  s t a b i l i t y  s i m i l a i i t i e s  in s t a t u s  p l ayed  a n  important role' in NFWA 
strategy. In contrast  to t h e  braceros  whose l e g a l  - s t a t u s  was  cond i t i oned  b y  t h e  
t e rms  o r t h e i r  temporary labor contract ,  t he  workers Chavez organized tended t o  b e  
e i the r  c i t izens o r  permanent-resident immigrants. Although t h e  a l i g n m e n t  of 10.cal. 
. - . - -  . -  -- . ---governments--and po l i ce  a g e n c i e s  behind  e m p l o y e r < ' g e n e r a l l ~  Bc'ted a g a i n s t  ' the 
protection of t h e  l e g a l ' r i g h t s  of e v e n  c i t i z e n  f a r m  workers ,  t h e  c l a i m s  t o  t h e  
p o l i t i c a l  a n d  l e g a l  e n t i t l e m e n t s  of  c i t i z e n s h i p  .of a n  o r ~ a n i z e d  group had g rea t  
potential  importance as a r e s o u r c e  f o r  t h e  f ledgl ing  o rgan iza t ion .  This  was,  o f  
cou r se ,  b o r n e  o u t  by t h e  v i c t o r i e s  o f  t h e  c i v i l - r ~ h t s  movement (affirmed in the 
passage of the Civil -Rights  Act  of 1964) a n d  . la ter  d e m o n s t r a t e d  in t h e  po l i t i ca l  
suppor t  o f  t h e  D e m o c r a t i c  Party in California and ekewhere  for  t h e  farm workers 
movement. More immediaikly, however, the  low wages and t h e  hor rendous  working 
conditions which citizen farm workers had suffered a s  a r e su l t -o f  t h e  flooding of the 
labor marke t  by braceros had c- rea ted  a long-standing,  s h a r e d  g r i e v a n c e  amongs t  
c i t i z e n  and  documented  immigrants. The predominance of nons i t i zens  in the labor 
market  and t h e  confounding e f f e c t  of shared c u l t u r e  a n d  n a t i o n a l  h e r i t a g e  among  
f a r m  w o r k e r s  (bo th  c i t i z e n  a n d  non-citizen) had muted the potential  for solidarity 
' along the  lines of  citizenship status. However, in t he  wake of the  termination of t h e .  
b r a c e r o  p r o g r a m ,  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  c i t i z e n  and documented workers to  claim jobs < 
formerly held by braceros and t o  assert their ,legal rights to organize unions appeared 
to i n c r e a s e  significantly.  This was especially- important among citizen workers who 
had already "investedn in t he  industry geographicalIy and organizationally and in te rms  
o f  t h e  long a n d  r a t h e r  v io l en t  h i s to ry  of a t t e m p t s  a t  unioniza t ion  by localized 
workers which were undercut by the use of t he  braceros and other  foreign workers as 
str ike breakers (cf., ~ a l a r z a ;  1971). 
P e r h a p s  t h e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  s h a r e d  s t a t u s  o f  t h e  t a r g e t e d  group w a s  
(andrema&s) ethn icity . The negative privileges which had been imposed on Mexicans 
and  Mexican-Americans as a result of the  political'  intervention of employers .in the  
labor market  and the  subsequent close association between f a rm work and low status  
a c t e d  t o  m a k e  jobs in t h e  f i e l d s  u n a t t r a c t i v e  t o  m o s t  Amer i can  workers. The 
Cj restriction o f  employment --- . to Mexicans and the  restr ic ted - . - - . - . . . - - - - -- - - e-m-ployment .  - - - - . . . - - - oppor_tu-nities- -- - - - - - -  . -- - . - L . -- . - -. --- 
f o r  Mex i can -Amer i cans  o u t s i d e  of  agriculture provided employers with a rekt ively 
captive labor f o r e  incapable o f  e f f ec t ivev  negotiating o v e r  t h e  r e w a r d s  o r  s t a t u s  
a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  f ield work; a t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e ,  t h e  a c c e p t a n c e  o f  low p a y ,  
subs tandard  working conditions and seasonality of employment accepted by Mexicans 
and Mexican-Americans was expldined as a result of  their own backwardness, lack of 
ambition and/or preference for a -!peasant-likeu- lifestyle. .The flip-side of repression, 
however, was the potential for ethnicity t o  serve a s  a basis for group solidarity. A 
- 
sol idar i ty  o f  s o r t s  was  indeed expressed through the  religious organizations such as 
the  Catholic churches (those which allowed Mexicans or Mexican- Americans entrance), 
soc ia l  a n d  c u l t u r a l .  events and observances (such "as festivali  ' and feasts on Mexican 
national' holidays, soccer matches, and traditional ' p r a c t i c e s  fo r  observing rel igious 
holidays),  t h e  c lus ter ing  of Mexican-Americans into neighborhood bars replete with 
Mexican music and dancing, and symbolic gestures such a s  putting Mexican flag decals 
on  family-  ca r s .  Though i t  must  b e  understood t h a t  t h e  ostentatious display of . 
national or cultural pride often served t o  s t imula te  r idicule,  if not  repression,  by 
/ 
Anglo. agents of social control, there nonetheless existed an underlying framework of 
ethnic solidarity--even without the  capacity independently t o  transform that  underlying 
framework into progressive action. 
Cons i s t en t  with the community organizing emphasis of the  NFWA, Chavez and 
his cadre sought to tap  ethnicity a s  a central-  symbol for the organization. Initially, 
- - 
ethnic solidarity, part icuhily as it came to b e  expressed in La Raza a t  a k t e r  point, 
was not the goal -of  the organization; rather, it was a device  for  f ac i l i t a t ing  t h e  - 
achievement of other goals, e.g., the creation of farm worker services and later union 
r e p r e s e n i i o n  a d  co l l ec t ive  bargaining. And, al though t h e  NFW A developed a 
symbiotic rehtionship with burgeoning civil. rights organizations among Hispanics which 
- -  - - -- - -  -- - .I - -  -- _ . _ .  _ . _ _ __ _ _  _ 
were concerned with the level'and quality of se rv ices  they received,  i t s  pr inc ipal  
concerns  w e r e  f a r  more immediate.  Thus, c u l t u r a l  and  rel igious symbols were 
employed to d raw in Mex,ican-American f a r m  workers  and t o  help d e f i n e  t h e  
commonality of their position and needs as farm workers. The flying of the  Mexican 
f l ag  inside NFWA of f i ces ,  t h e  post ing o f  p ic tures-of  the  Virgen de Guadalupe (a 
patron saint), Emiliano Zapata and Pancho 'Villa, t h e  conduc t  of most  meetings.  in 
Spanish, and t h e  l a t e r  design of t h e  organizat ion 's  flag using an Aztec eagle- all. 
a t tempted to promote a consciousness of  sha red  status in o rde r  to mobil ize t h e  
energies of the  membership -toward group goals. 
The community organizing phase of the farm workers'  movement  can  thus  b e  
viewed a s  a period in which an extensive organizational infrastructure was developed, 
but developed with resources drawn a s  much from the local- scene as from e x t e r n a l  
groups. At this point i t  woula be  fruitless to  weigh the relative contribution of local 
and external resources to the  organization's advances; i t  should, however ,  b e  c l e a r  
t h a t  t h e  f a c t o r s  we have  e labora ted-- the  structure of the  production system, the  
existence of extensive social-and informal'networks (or grapevines),  res ident ia l '  and  
organiza t ional '  s t ab i l i ty  among the  targeted workers, and similarities in legal s tatus 
and ethnicity-are important in understanding how organization was achieved. 
The community organizing stategy employed by the NFWA gave the' organization 
a distinct orientation toward self-help despite the  infusion of financial resources from 
the  outside. Chavezls desire t o  c rea te  overlapping bonds of cooperation among farm 
workers reflected the difficulties of facing any effort  t o  develop collective action in 
t h e  f a c e  of  hos t i le  employers  and t h e i r  suppor te r s ,  t h e  excep t iona l  s t a t u s  of  
agricultural enterprises and agricultural  ' workers  economical ly  and poli t ical ly , t h e  
r e l a t i v e ~ l o w  k v e l  of real financial support from the AFL-CIO, the  suspicions held 
by f a r m  workers  of labor organizers  f rom t h e  ou t s ide ,  a n d  h i s  own f e a r  o f  
dependence on outside organizations'turning into subordination. Thus, . the organization 
took on a distinctly communal. character: outsiders (most particularly Anglo students 
a n d  c l e r g y )  who did join t h e  NFWA w e r e  ca re fu l ly  inser ted  in to  posi t ions of 
responsibility but  ' f irgely excluded f r o m  t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  a u t h o r i t y ;  t h e i r  labor  as 
p ro fe s s iona l  ' s t a f f  members ,  researchers ,  picketk, clgfks, couriers and; occasionally, 
advisors was .of g r e a t  . importance to the g&ls of the organization but  their  capacity 
to exercise leadership, d i rec t  t h e  -"realw inembership, and undertake autonomous action 
were  severeiy circumscribed. Those who could not  accept  their  positions as privates 
- 
in t h e  NFWA a r m y  (and sometimes as highly' skilled privates) were unceremoniously 
drummed out. The f ac t  tha t  few volunteers (even some who had spent t ime working 
in  t h e  f ie lds)  were accorded membership in t he  organization (honorary or otherwise) 
underscores their restricted role. To have .fully integrated volunteers, however, would 
h a v e  unde rmined  t h e  principal'philosophy of t h e  organization. In many respects, t o  
accord a lower status to those whose social and economic s t a t u s  was  much h ighe r  
outside the  organization symbolically promoted t h e  communal character  of the  NFWA. 
Emphas i s  on t h e  c o m m u n a l  c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  was  c l e a r l y  a n  
important factor  in engaging and extending the  involvement of farm worker members. 
And, as long as t h e  .activities in which t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  engaged  w e r e  r e l a t i ve ly  
loca l i zed ,  t a s k s  a n d  respons ib i l i t i es  could b e  shared and parcelled on the  basis of 
n e e d ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  o f f i c e  o r  expe r t i s e .  B u r e a c r a t i c  o rgan iza t ion  w a s  no t  o n l y  
u n d e s i r a b l e  but.  a l s o  largely '  unnecessary .  Y e t ,  as t h e  organiza t ion ' s  r a n g e  of  
.-- 
act ivi t ies  and responsibilites expanded with t h e  opening o f  d i r e c t  b a t t l e s  f o r  union 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  and. t h e  succes s fu l  acqu i s i t i on  of  c o n t r a c t s ,  t h e  tension between 
communal ' and  bureacratic administration mushroomed. That tension, as we will argue 
in the  n z t  two sections, was exacerbated by the  need to  exploit external.  resources-- 
especially in organizing successful . boycott  campaigns--tn faci l i ta te  t he  building of t he  
I C- -  -- - - -  - 
- --  --unim 
The Union-Building Phase: 1967-1973 ' 
T h e  i n i t i a l  involvement  of t he  NFWA in agricultural. unionism, confronting the  
growers  as employers, was not t he  product of Chavez's desires. Unionism was thrust 
upon t h e  NFWA when the  former A g r i c u l ~ r a l  Workers (kganizing Committee (AWOC), 
a n  AFL-CIO creat ion with an act ive core  of Filipino workers, shifted their strike as 
t h e  season  moved  no r thward  f rom t h e  C i a c h e l l a  Valley (where the  NFWA lacked 
membership and had no prior commitments) t o  t he  Delano area where the  -NFWA was  
concentrated. 
In S e p t e m b e r  1965, Chavez was dragged reluctantly- into the  strike by his own 
membership which r e fused  t o  c r o s s  AWOC p i c k e t  l ines .  C h a v e z  was  u n c e r t a i n  
w h e t h e r  NFWA h a d  r e a c h e d  t h e  l e v e l  o f  s t r e n g t h  neces sa ry  t o  win. The  
organizational '  test came when the strike was successful ' in br inging  o u t  worke r s  t o  
s tand on t h e  picket  lines, bu t  i t  was a failure economically. This strike's failure-in 
its inability to make employers hurt financially-originates in the  dispersed character  .= 
o f  California agriculture and, most importantly, t h e  capacity of growers t o  effectively ' 
import strikebreaking workers from Mexico. 
The boycot t  as an  organizational'weapon. 
Confronted by the dilemma of being able  to successfully organize worke r s  a n d  
pull t h e m  into the  picket  lines but  not being able' to halt 'production because of t h e  
importat ion o f  s t r i k e b r e a k e r s ,  Chavez  t u r n e d  t o  a new technique:  t h e  b o y c o t t .  
Boycotts have been a traditional weapon of labor b u t  have not  always had outstanding 
success. Despite early .a t tempts  made by organizations l ike the  International '  Lad ie s  
Garment Workers Union t o  educate  the  general public t o  t he  importance of t he  union 
label, b w t t s  have onM been successful -under two circumstances:' the  first  is where 
a c o m m o d i t y  i s  intended primarily. for workers, and organized workers in particular; 
thus boycot ts  on overalls have relatively successfuLwhereas t h o s e  a i m e d  at r egu la r  
sui ts  have not. The second has been t h a t  in which striking unions initiate secondary 
boycotts,  calling on other unionists t o  refuse t o  handle merchand i se  t h a t  h a s  b e e n  
designated as- "hotn' o r  nonunion. Secondary b o y c o t t s  a r e  now i l legal  under t h e  
provisions o f  t h e  'Taft-Hart ley A c t  and t h e  prima6y (consumer) boycott has been 
recognized by most unions as a generally ineffective weapon. 
- 
Chavez changed th i s  s i tuat ion,  resuscitating the  boycott as a biting economic 
weapon. Through very e f f e c t i v e  public  r e l a t ions ,  a n  emphasis  on nonviolence, 
dramatic peregrinaciones (pilgrimages), such as the  march from Delano t o  Sacramento, 
and highly-publicized fasts  by Chavez, the plight of the farm worker was- made much 
more visible. While farm catastrophies-a bus run . down by a train, the cremation of 
a family in farm worker shacks--had always c r e a t e d  s t i r s  of conscience ,  Chavez's 
e f f e c t i v e  use  of  t h e  media brought  th i s  l eve l  o f  consciousness t o  a s t a t e  of 
continuing and a c t i v e  gui l t  in t h e  h e a r t s  and minds of  America's urban,  l ibe ra l '  
popu IA tion. 
Besides a c a p a c i t y  for  d ramat ic  public presentations that  won national media 
coverage, Chavez developed the ability of t h e  UFW ( t h e  organizat ion 's  name  was  
changed f rom NFWA t o  UFWOC, signifying its s ta tus  a s  an organizing committee 
when it merged with AWOC) membership t o  t r a n s h t e  the farm workers' message into 
specific, local' actions: he made i t  possible for urban populations t o  support the  farm 
workers without -any grea t  personal cost .  Dispersing t h e  UFW c o r e  t o  dozens  o f  
cities,  the  plight of the  farm workers was made meaningful through actual ,huekistas  
(strikes) who could ar t imla te  their experiences to urban audiences. The ski l ls  t h e y  
h a d  d e v e l o p e d  organiza t ional ly .  through pa r t i c ipa t ion  in t h e  UFW now proved 
i n v a l u a b c  
The  impor tance  of t h e  boyco t t  strategy as a device for applying pressure on 
employers when local ' strike efforts  had only limited success in effect ing production 
c a n n o t  b e  underemphasized (cf., Friedland and Thomas, 1974: 56-69), but  it 
tended to  shift  the  organizat ion 's  ene rg ies  away  f rom s t ruggles  a t  t h e  point  o f  
production. h the first place, the  development of the boycott campaigns channeled 
much .organiza t ional  energy i n t o  maintaining a highly visible presence in a k r g e  
number of metropol i tan  areas .  Not orily was  Chavez  d ispatched on .exhausting 
n a t i o n a l ' t o u r s  of  churches ,  union hal l s  and  co l l ege  campuses ,  b u t  many of the 
secondary leaders of the  union followed t o  .coordinate  o r  expand b o y c o t t  e f fo r t s .  
Though throughout t h e  mist intense period of the  boycott campaigns (1966-73) the 
UFW continued to  assign organizers t o  the .fields and rural'communities, the boycotts 
w e r e  proving t o  b e  the  most productive means for applying pressure t o  recalcitrant 
employers. The boycotts, though effective, did not bring abou t  i m m e d i a t e  results .  
The wine and table 'grape boycotts yielded fruit only after  two years of effort.  For 
the membership, the boycott strategy proved effective in the  long-run b u t  did no t  
provide  immedia te  income: support for striking families was limited to the outside 
aid it could muster. Many more workers sympathetic t o  t h e  c a u s e  w e r e  asked t o  
keep the  faith but  t o  keep working at non-struck ranches and wait out  the boycott. 
The difficulties of carrying on t h e  b a t t l e s  on s e v e r a l '  f r o n t s  g r e w  with t h e  
decision t o  extend the boycott to table grapes and, later, t o  lettuce. With Chavez 
and the  core leadership of the  union stumping the ci t ies  to make the boycotts work, 
loca l  organiz ing e f f o r t s  w e r e  e r r a t i c  and o f t e n  unsuccessful. Growers imported 
strikebreakers with impunity and sought t o  undermine the union's appeal .  through- lo&l' 
" truth squadsw and severe police harassment of strikers and their families. Though 
local official3 of t h e  union s t ruggled  t o  defend members  and t h e  organizat ion 's  
tenuous-ieothold's,  t h e i r  e f f o r t s  w e r e  o f t e n  undermined by a r b i t r a r y  commands 
emanating from union headquarters (usually where  ever  Chavez  was) which would 
dispatch them from a field'office in Salirias t o  a boycott office in Detroit. 
The union's communal .  s t r u c t u r e  and s t rong  leadership (in Chavez) g rea t ly  
enhanced  i t s  abi l i ty  t o  respond rapidly'to the  various contingencies i t  faced. The 
. . 
college students .ad young peop'le, in pa r t i cu la r ,  .proved q u i t e  use fu l '  in t h i s  way. 
Thei r  c o m m i t m e n t  to t h e  organiza t ion ,  r e v e r e n c e  - f o r  Chavez  and their low-pay 
e n a b l d  them t o  b e  shuttled from one locale o r  campaign t o  ano the r  a t  ve ry  . l i t t l e  
cos t .  But,  t h e  fac i l i ty  with which the union responded als6 tended to disguise the  
f ac t  that  its react ive  orientation made it vuherable to diversion by employers  -and 
other opposing forces. For example, the Proposition 22 ballot initiative in 1971-72,an 
employer-sponsored campaign to produce a law sympathetic t o  their interests, halted 
much of the UFWts organizing in the fields and drained resources from urban boycott 
campaigns. The intiative y a s  defeated but disrupted the  boycott and strike efforts. 
D e s p i t e  t h e  p rob lems  i t  engendered,  t h e  boyco t t  s t r a t e g y  did provide a 
significant lever in obtaining representation and contracts. During. this period (1966- 
73) the UFW undertook boycotts in three commodities: wine grapes, table 'grapes and 
lettuce. In part ,  the  characteristics of the political ' economy of t h e s e  com modit ie  s 
a c c o u n t  for  t h e  different successes and failures of the  boycott actions. The UFW's 
initia1"boycott began in 1966 with wine g rapes ,  a commodi ty  grown by a mix o f  
g rowers  ranging f rom t h e  g i a n t  Schenley corporation t o  many local- growers. For 
Schenley, a vertically-integrated corporation tha t  became involved in ag r i cu l tu re  in 
r e c e n t  years ,  wine growing was b u t  a smal l  p a r t  of  a l a rge r  operation. More 
. .- 
importantly, however, Schenley l abe l s  such a s  -1.W. Harper  were  d i s t inc t  in t h e  
p u b l i c ' s  ' mind- - the  p r o d u c t  of  decades  of adver t i z ing  t o  develop brand-name 
identification. It is not surprising, then, tha t  Schenley was t h e  f i r s t  of t h e  g r a p e  
grower- agree to a UFW contract  when confronted by a boycott. 
The other wine-grape growers were less vulrierable. Most w e r e  producers  of  
C: 
table wines tha t  they distilled, bottled and distributed under their own labels. Unlike 
Schenley , their economic success depended almost en t i r ev  on wines; unlike Schenley , 
while striving for brand-name identification, their advertising budgets were miniscule' 
in comparison and their' . . .Wek had less prominence. The union's boyco t t  t h e r e f o r e  
had -to develop negative product identification. Although the process was kngtfry, the  
boycott o rgan iza t ion  u l t ima te ly  . accomplished t h i s  purpose. This produced f ive  
contracts  with the  major wine growers of the  southern San Joaquin Valley in 1968-69. 
Between then and 1973, the UFW extended its base with this type of grower. 
The second commodi ty  t h e  UFW b o y c o t t e d  was  t a b l e  .grapes. This boycott 
began in August 1967 when the union successfully organized workers from Giumarra 
vineyards,  t h e  la rges t  grower of seedlejs grapes'in the  United States. Unlike wine 
grapes, table grapes a r e  grown mainly by medium sized growers ,  few of whom a r e  
ve r t i ca l ly  in teg ra ted .  Moreover, product identification of table.  grapes is negligible 
since the  public does not buy table grapes by their Wel. Thus an initial boycott of 
selected companies spread to  all. table grapes as the strike against Giumarra extended 
t o  the  entire  table grape industry. Boycott organizations in every major metropolitan 
center  were again called into action. 
The table 'grape  boycott involved a long and protracted educational campaign by 
local'organizations with Chavez providing the  d r a m a t i c  na t iona l -  news t o  keep t h e  
issue before millions of urban residents. Within a year of i ts  inception, i t  began to  
hurt the  growers. The suc&ss of the  table-grape b o y c o t t  was  determined by t h e  
s p e c i a l  f e a t u r e s  of  t h e  commodity and t h e  e d u c a t i v e  va lue  t h a t  t h e  boyco t t  
represented for urban populiitions. Grapes a r e  re la t ive  luxur ies  unt i l  t hey  become 
cheap in the  peak season. Thus, when the price is low they a re  consumed in large 
q u a n t i t i q  when the  p r i c e  r ises,  consumption drops signif icantly.  As t h e  g rape  
b o y c o t t  w a s  publ ic ized  through t h e  e f f o r t s  o f  t h e  loca l  boyco t t  c o m m i t t e e s ,  
housewives began. to -treat grapes a s  if .they were -expensiv_e (e.g., .foregoing them for i 
o t h e r  avai lable-  frui ts) .  This was f a c i l i t a t e d  by t h e  f a c t  tha t  grapes come into 
supermarkets roughly a t  the same time as apples, peaches and pears .  The boyco t t  
proved, over several-years, to be successful. Although a hard and bitter struggle for 
the  UFW, once again the  boycott proved its utility as a weapon of the  union. 
The situation changed significantw when the  UFW was drawn i n t o  t h e  l e t t u c e  
s t r ike .  L e t t u c e ,  unlike grapes ,  is  highly' -"inelasticn--few s u b s t i t u t e s  ex i s t  and 
consumption rates remain relative'v stable within a broad price range. .Thus grower 
reaction was mixed when Chavez and the union was drawn into the lettuce strike of 
the  Salinas Valley in 1969 and threatened a boycott to make the strike economically 
successful .  Among l e t t u c e  producers  who w e r e  vert ical ly integrated, with large 
corporate ent i t ies  having strong product identification in other markets, the threat o f  
b o y c o t t  produced three contracts. Freshpict, the  corporation associated with Purex 
(bleaches and detergents), fel t  threatened by a national 'boycott of its well-advertized 
products, not simply. its lettuce. The same held for Interharvest (later know a s  Sun 
Harvest and owned by United Brands) and Pic-N-Pac (Del ~ o n t e ) .  
The  bulk-  of t h e  Salinas Valley lettuce growers, highly specialized growers of 
let tuce and several 'rekited crops, resisted the  threa t  of the boycott and refused t o  
sign with the  UFW. Only' one locally- based lettuce grower of any significance signed 
with the  union. The UFW retaliated with a boycott against lettuce, but this proved 
hrgely u n s u c c e ~ f u l ,  for the  reasons described earlier. Its -lack of success was only 
- -- 
i n  p a r t  d u e  to  an  on-again, off-again s e r i e s  o f  t a c t i c a l  e r r o r s  by . t h e  u n i o n ,  
harassment by the  employers, alleged heavy purchasing of lettuce by the Department 
of Defense (during the Nixon administration) and other factors. The f a c t  remained 
i n e x o r a m  ' let tuce was seen by most consumers as 'hecessary" and non-substitutable; 
The le t tuce  boycott failed. 
- -- . L 
By e a r l y  1973 t h e  exper ience  of t h e  UFW h a d b G n % n e  o f  being a b l e  t o  
successfully organize workers and bring them out on strike, finding that strikes could 
only' become economically' effective through a boycott--at least in some cases. The 
UFW had become reliant upon the  boycott strategy and on the  availability of external '  
sources of support t o  buttress local strikes and organiiing activities. Chavez strongly* 
opposed any development which would legally impede the  u s e  o f  t h e  boycott .  For  
t h i s  reason Chavez ,  a f t e r  initial1 j supporting coverage for farm workers under the 
National Labor Relations Act, reversed himself. While coverage would have provided 
a n  e l e c t o r a l  procedure  through which farm workers could d e s i g ~ t e  their union, i t  
would have el iminated t h e  boyco t t  weapon. Moreover, ' re l iance  on t h e  boyco t t  
strategy fostered a concentration of effort  in those industries in which contracts had 
been won--wine and table grapes-and the one in which an organizing campaign had 
been  in i t i a t ed  b u t  stalled--lettuce. The tremendous organizational commitment t o  
mobilizing external~support ,  exacerbated by the  tenuousness of t h e  c o n t r a c t s  it had 
won and by the  continuing harassment from growers and their political' allies, began -t 
t o  erode the  union's capacity t o  do extensive community organizing prior to launching 
campa igns  in o t h e r  industr ies .  With t h e ,  o n s e t  of  employer efforts t o  engage in 
"union ,sub~titution'~--through t h e  negot ia t ion  of  s w e e t h e a r t  c o n t r a c t  w i t h  t h e  
T e a m s t e r s  Un ion-expansion was curtailed as the  UFW sought desperately- .to protect 
the  ground it won. 
Contracts and union structure. 
The  successful  acquisition of contracts by way of boycott- pressure presented a 
paradox t o  t h e  UFW:' what  had been a communa l '  organiza t ion  bui l t  a r o u n d  a 
r e l a t ive ly  loose division of  labor and an explicit opposition t o  hierarchical relations 
was nourfaced with a sys tem o f  c o n t r a c t  negot ia t ion  and adminis t ra t ion  .which, 
despite the  high level of member input into i ts  goals, was structured along the lines 
i of modem collective bargaining agreements. Employers insisted t h a t ,  if they were  
going to  b e  forced t o  contract  with the union, the  UFW had to behave in a manner 
consistent with t r a d e  union pract ice: '  e.g., provide  a cons i s t en t  and p red ic tab le  
negotiating team with t h e  authority to act on behalf of the  membership, pol ice  its 
membership  wi th  regard  to  contrac t  provisions, orgahize a reliable supply of labor, 
administer the  complex provisions dealing with health, m e d i d  - and seniority benefits, 
and  es tab l i sh  and support  the  grievancehandling machinery which would effectively 
reduce conflict in the fields. The union contributed to the  problem by insisting that 
- 
it t a k e  over  t h e  t a sk  of  r ec ru i t ing  and a l loca t ing  labor through a hir ing ha l l  
arrangement. Following somewhat on the model 'of the  hiring halls developed in the  
longshoring industry,  t h e  UFW sought  t o  replace the exploitative Jgbor contractor 
system with a mechanism for  more  fa i r ly  a l loca t ing  work ass ignments  and f o r  
guarding t h e  wage and senior i ty  provisions of  t h e  contract .  Although the union 
resisted the pressuring to model- itself a f ter  other f%usinessfl- unions (even in the face  
of  AFL-CIO urging t h a t  it d o  so), it had mushroomed into an organization with 
multiple responsibilities, some of which were quite t e c h n i d  ' in character. 
With the accretion of a broad range of responsibilities, demands for appropriate 
expertise and a barrage of lists, forms and c k i m s  to handle, the  UFW turned initially 
t o  its most easily. accessible ' source of inexpensive, skilled lkbor: volunteers. Lawyers, 
accountants, professionals of various sorts (including doctors and nurses), and students 
f rom co l l ege  campuses were recruited to handle the  mass of paperwork and t o  iron 
out the  details of contract  provisions under - t h e  genera l .  supervision of  t h e  union 
leadership.  Volunteers were not, however, any leis an issue than they had been in 
the UFW's formative years. They provided knowledge and skill a t  a low cos t .  But,  
they we= outsiders culturally and liriguistically; they sometimes resisted the authority 
of those less knowledgeable about the intricacies of paperwork; and they were  n o t  
t i ed  to the-organiza t ion  in t h e  fashion farm worker members weree ie . ,  students - 
could return to 'college and middle class life, professionals  could g o  back t o  t h e i r  
previous pursuits, but  farm workers had no such alternatives. 
- -As .the -pressure .* ~regularize -contract administration increased (part iculafly on 
;the ,part o f  members  eager -to .make claims on new&-war benefits), -the problem of 
interndl '.structure -intensified. Chavez ;and members of ;the ' leadership c a d r e  .railed 
a g a i n s t  .the bureaucra t i za t ion  o f  t h e  union as a t h r e a t  t o  t h e  solidarity of the  
membership -and to the openness of  .union affairs. At the same time, dissatisfaction 
- 
mounted among members  as t h e  union experienced difficultj. in handling contract  
Claims and work d i spa tches  and grower  i m p a t i e n c e -  t r e b l e d  w i t h  t h e  un ion ' s  
unwillingness t o  respond --'p~mfessionally." An uneasy solution emerged with volunteers 
handling much of the  paperwork but lacking any' clear c h i m  t o  bureaucratic authority 
and Chavez and the  executive committee of the  union maintaining authority over all  
activities in the  union. Chavez, in particirlar, bore the  weight of leadership in t h e  
organiz ing campaigns ,  boyco t t  e f f o r t s  and  c o n t r a c t  nego t i a t ion  and leadership. 
Although the  system functioned f a i r v  well because of Chavez's energy and personal  
authority, i t  could' only serve a s  a temporary solution t o  a complex set of problems. 
.-, 
One thing was clear: the functioning of the  union depended on Chavez's knowledge of 
a l l  a s p e c t s  of  its operat ion and his presence t o  oversee their performance. In his 
absence--or in :light of -new developments-the system faltered. 
A s  long  as t h e  range  of a c t i v i t i e s  in pol i t ica l  leadership  and co l l ec t ive  
- - 
bargaining contract  administration remained re la t ive ly  narrow, it was possible f o r  
Chavez  t o  c e n t r a l i z e  his au thor i ty  over  a l l  ac t iv i t i e s .  However, as tha t  range 
expanded, Chavez's ability t o  control diminished. Diminished control was on occasion 
respond=+ t o  wi th  a fo rm o f  o rgan iza t iona l  housecleaning aimed at  the nascent 
bu.reaucratse: on more than one occasion, Chavez or a representative returned t o  the  
i 
na t iona l  h e a d q u a r 3 e r s  -and a rb i t r a r i ly '  shif ted andlor dismissed departmental heads. 
Thus, for a t ime at least, the  bureaucracy was kept in jeopardy. The housecleaning 
and the  tension which accompanied i t  were often justified in terms of the need for 
. - ,.- - - -  greater tparftcipation -& ~-$he @art'of members jn $he ~ ~ l ~ r l i i r n g s  'bf -&e.*nion. - l h e r e  
' . I  
+ - - -- 
:wai&ii-+an . i r _  -=bndercur ren t  a3--insiders ;(me f i e f s  a n d  .i)licanos) ws.. outSiders d.&ngbs), - - .  - .  
* - - - - _ 
A - -tho* -%havez n e v e r  . - e ~ p ~ c i t & : & b e l d  :it -as&&. - - .  
.But, --the niotivating -factor -remained-+one o f  a resistance to .the -estziblishrnent of ,- 
. an e n t r e n c h e d  bureaucracy. The %resistin* :to bureaucracy was fueled a s  m u c h  %y the 
/ 
i m m e d i a t e  h i s t o r i c a l  l egacy  -of c o m m u n i t y  o rgan  k i n g  upon which f i e  union -was 
founded as its opposite, bureaucratization, was by t h e  c o n t r a c t  succes ses  r e su l t i ng  
f r o m  t h e  b o y c o t t  s t r a t e g y .  The official '  response t o  t he  problein, culminating this 
phase with t h e  UFW's consitutional conven t ion  in  1973, ind ica t ed  how s e v e r e  t h e  
confl ic t  had become: in a series of wide-rang ing and occasionally acrimonious debates,  
t h e  m e m b e r s h i p  vo ted  t o  e s t ab l i sh  o v e r s i g h t  c o m m i t t e e s  f o r  e a c h  o f  t h e  main 
f u n c t i o n a l - d e p a r t m e n t s  o f  t h e  union wi th  a m e a s u r e  of  author-ity wrested from 
depar tment  heads and vested in the  committees.  
The  contention between communal' and bureaucrat ic  administration thus  operated 
a t  two levels. On one level, t he  union sought to avoid the creation of a bureaucracy 
i n t e r v e n i n g  between the  leaders  and the membership. The capacity of t h e  union to 
mobiiiize i t s  membership and shift its ene rg i e s  in t h e  d i r e c t i o n  of  o n e  o r  a n o t h e r  
t h r e a t  depended ,  i t  seemed, on a lack of distinction between (or vested interest  in) 
h i e r a r c h i d  - levels of the  organization. 
On a second level, however, t h e  conflict  was centered on the  .relative influence 
of t h e  two developing-. "governments". (Cook, 1962) in t h e  union: one a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  
p o l i t i c =  l e a d e r s h i p  a n d  p r o c e s s  a n d  t h e  o t h e r  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  c o l l e c t i v e  
bargainingjcontract administration. As long as c o n t r a c t s  w e r e  - re la t ive ly  r a r e ,  t h e  
- - <: 
p o l i t i c a l  l eade r sh ip  o f  t h e  union r e m a i n e d  foremost.  - ~ h a v e z  and the core  cadre 
e f fec t ive ly  ' l e d  a n d  remained  in c l o s e  c o n t a c t  wi th  t h e  membership.  C o n t r a c t  
victories, however, demanded the  creation of  some structure t o  deal  with the highly 
- - - m i & l z & u t  i&lti~l&&iil&&f tc0ntrac.s. $Despite  he c e n t r a l i t y - s f  . . :=he ipolitic81. -ii ? - *t--* , - -  - . -  
=-- &:,-2 . - -3 
' -  'lekderbhip ,%fidk ~ c 6 m m u n a l . d d e o l 6  bvekming k h e  smrgan iza&n,  :.it %%an to -. 4 A**- , - 9 -  ,- , - *  1 ? -a_+ , - *  -. - - ": 
rmegc,gasF!Godk i n o t d  .-in h a  in~ight%l%nki'ijriii af~&'tproblem :of +dual - , _  .- - . . -.. 
-in ..unions, 3 h a t  %he adminais t ra t ion  .of .*hard-won x o n t r a c t s  w a s  _more immedia teb  
, - 
Jmportant  .to the membership. ?- 
.-Splits in the  membership. 
Despite the UFW's initial- successes in bringing workers in the  grape and lettuce 
industries out of the  fields and winning contracts by way of effect ive boycot ts ,  t h e  
union faced a dilemma in terms of  the  composition of its membership. As discussed 
earlier,  the historically developed agricultural production system rested heavily upon 
t h e  avai labi l i ty  of  a highly e l a s t i c  and vulnerable '  supp'ly of labor. The UFW's 
community organizing approach corresponded to - the  existing separat ion of  t h e  labor  -c 
market into citizens and documented workers vs. undocumented workers. Though such 
a n  a p p r o a c h  w a s  r a r e l y  e x p l i c i t ,  t h e  e m p h a s i s  on  g e o r g a p h i c a l l y  a n d l o r  
organiza t ional ly  s t a b l e  workers  c r e a t e d  a d e  f a c t o  spl i t .  Moreover, the  active 
importation of undocumented workers as strikebreakers by employers served to further 
s e p a r a t e  t h e  l abor  force .  Thus, t h e  dist inct ion came to  have organizational and 
emotional significance. 
At the  same time tha t  it at tempted to wrest control-over recruitment within a 
dividedeGbor market, the union could not overlook the fac t  t h a t  at least some of i t s  
members  in many bargaining units and industries were indeed undocumented andlor 
compos&f former strikebreakers. h this connection, the boyco t t  s t r a t e g y  was a 
principle factor in explaining how the  most vulnerable members of the  labor force- 
- -- 4 SndJFded, one cause-of the-low wages and des t ruct ive  working condi t ions  found 
genera l ly  in agriculture--came t o  b e  members of the  UFW. In ef fec t ,  boycotts and 
the  pressure from already unionized firms succeeded in bringing in to  t h e  union, by 
. - 
>- 
fiat,:many workers -who had  not been:members:previwsly. !Sine She a n i o n  -did =not  
have a sufficientiy large -.membership:%o m p h c e  ;all nonvnion w o r k e r s a n a n y : r e m a ~  - 
. 7 - .  
.and had :to b e  "organizedn into -* hniion. 
The Union Expansion ;Phase: 1973-82 
T h e  four  y e a r s  f rom -1970-7.3 r e p r e s e n t e d  a .period o f  g rea t  change for . the 
- 
United Farm Workers union. Paradoxically, it was in this period tha t  the UFW was 
both  enjoying -the f ru i t s  of its boycott successes (in te rms of the  contracts won in 
t h e  g r a p e  industry)  and suffer ing  its g r e a t e s t " 1 o s s e s  ( in  t e r m s  o f  c o n t r a c t s  
subsequently lost  to  the  Teamsters Union). The intrusion of the  Teamsters and the 
weakening of t h e  boyco t t  weapon, w e  will  a rgue ,  forced t h e  union back in to  a 
- s t r a t e g y  of communi ty  organizing which, with t h e  passage  of p r o t e c t i v e  labor 
legislation in California, f ac i l i t a t ed  expansion through represen ta t iona l  elect ions.  -, 
Expansion has not, however, resolved the problems raised earlier. If anything, i t  has 
heightened the  tension between the communal' ideology of t h e  organiza t ion  and t h e  
ever-pressing need t o  d e a l  with contract  and organizational expansion. And, while 
r e su r rec t ion  of t h e  communi ty  organizing s t r a t e g y  helped s t r e n g t h e n  bonds o f  
I 
commitment between members and the union, i t  has also exacerbated the underlying 
split in the membership and the 'labor force between citizen/documented workers and 
-- 
undocumented workers. Furthermore, the  very successes of this period (I 973-82) have 
created what presently exists as the most severe crisis the UFW faces:  t h e  - loss o f  
jobs through mechanization. In this section we will deal 'most directly with the issue 
of c o m ~ l  vs. bureaucra t i c  organiza t ion  and leave  t h e  issue of sp l i t s  in t h e  
membership and mechanization t o  the final, concluding section. 
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When the UFW began i ts  organizational activities in the Delano a r e a ,  growers  
responded with their traditional -hostility. This involved the gamut of techniques tha t  
proved successful-in t h e  past:' harassment  by l o c a l  p o l i c e  agenc ie s ,  local ly  issued 
in junc t ions  a g a i n s t  p i c k e t s  and ,  o f  course, the  importation of  strike-breakers from 
Mexico. These union-busting techniques were locally e f fec t ive  but  could .not come t o  
g r i p s  wi th  t h e  b o y c o t t  c a m p a i g n  t h a t  increasingly b i t  into t h e  growers' economic 
position. Despite numerous defensive measures, .including the  a t t e m p t e d  pas sage  of  
p roh ib i t i ve  l eg i s l a t i t on  on the  state and federal levels, g r ape  growers succumbed to  
t h e  boycott  and negotiated accords with the UFW in 1969-70. The g r a p e  c o n t r a c t s  
s e r v e d  t o  b o l s t e r  con f idence  in r a n k s  of t h e  union a n d  w e r e  r ega rded  by t h e  
m l i f o m i a  Farm Bureau and  t h e  Sa l inas  Valley l e t t u c e  g r o w e r s  a s  a b e t r a y a l -  o f  
g rower  so l ida r i t y  (a l though t h e  le t tuce growers never provided act ive or prolonged 
support to their counterparts  in t he  grape industry). The  s igning of  t h e  c o n t r a c t s  
with the  UFW 'produced staggering confusion in t h e  Salinas Valley a s  growers sought 
t o  devise a new s tance  with which t o  defend themsklves. 
Sa l inas  l e t t u c e  g r o w e r s  ini t ia l ly  undertook the development of the traditional 
union-busting techniques but a second strategy evolved when t h e  l e t t u c e  h a r v e s t e r s  
joined t h e  UFW a n d  made  t h e  s t r i k e  t ake  e f fec t .  This new strategy consisted of 
''union substitution". (F r i ed l and  and  Thomas ,  1974: 59). J u s t  as a consumer  c a n  
s u b s t i t u t e  a p p l e s ,  p e a c h e s  o r  p e a r s  f o r  g r a p e s ,  t h e  Sa l inas  g r o w e r s  s aw t h e  
oppor tun i ty  t o  r e c o g n i z e  t h e  T e a m s t e r s  union (wi th  whom many had c o n t r a c t s  
cove r ing  t r u c k  d r i v e r s  a n d  warehouse  workers )  r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  UFW. With no 
warning, growers signed dozens of contracts  with the  Teamsters  in the spring of 1970 
while '  W v e z  conc luded  t h e  second major  b o y c o t t  s u c c e s s  wi th  the  table%rape 
growers of the  San Joaquin Valley. 
The UFW had not  been inactive in Salinas; indeed, t h e  union had organizational 1 
centers  there and other places in California. However, as no ted  in t h e  p receed ing  
s e c t i o n ,  t h e  UFW's t e n d e n c y  t o w a r d  a s ing le- i ssue  a p p r o a c h  had s o m e w h a t  
undernourished t h e  S l i n a s  organizing e f fo r t  in order  t o  feed they boycot t  campaigns. 
In t h e  w a k e  o f  t h e  T e a m s t e r  c o n t r a c t s ,  h o w e v e r ,  - t h e  Sa l inas  organizing effor ts  
suddenly b e c a m e  massive. In f a c t ,  t h e  w o r k e r s  .p i led  i n t o  t h e  UFW. L e t t u c e  
w o r k e r s ,  t o  a n  e v e n  g r e a t e r  e x t e n t  t h a n  their  counterparts  in the grape  industry, 
were organized into durable and cohesive work t e a m s  (called c rews)  which a f f o r d e d  
t h e  union access t o  aireadyXonstructed work units and an  intense set of social and 
informational ' networks in the industry. For several  weeks, the stike hurt  production 
seriously' .  As the  growers struck back, t h e  harassment process was accompanied by 
the  gradual  importation of strikebreakers. Le t tuce  product  ion c l imbed a n d ,  a s  t h e  
season drew near i t s  end, i t  became obvious t h a t  t he  economic e f f ec t  of the  strike 
was declining. At this stage, Chavez aga in  moved t o  t h e  b o y c o t  s t r a t e g y .  While 
c o n t r a c t s  were  signed with a small number of vertically-integrated-corporations, the  
bulk of the  industry resisted the UFWts a t t ack  and h id  behind t h e  Teams te r s .  As 
n o t e d  e a r l i e r ,  t he  boycott of le t tuce failed to pack the  economic punch of previous 
boycotts.  
Finally, in t he  summer of 1973, a substantial 'number of grape growers-many of 
whom held cont rac ts  with the UFW tha t  expired t h a t  year-followed the  example of 
t h e  Sa l inas  g r o w e r s  and consumated hasty marriages with the Teamsters. The UFW, 
suddenly stripped of the foundation on which i t s  union organiza t ion  had  b e e n  bu'ilt, 
struggled fiercely throughout t he  summer and fall  t o  regain the  contracts  i t  had lost. 
But, t h e  grape strike of 1973 could not overcome t h e  combined forces of the  growers 
and the-amsters. In the af termath,  Chavez resurrected the  table-grape and wine- 
grape  boycot ts  t o  run concurrently with the  le t tuce  a m p a i g n .  
Though C h a v e z  a l luded  occas iona l ly  t o  t h e  possibi'lify of a protracted ("ten 
year'3 boycot t  campaign t o  regain.lost ground, two sets of .factors forced a return t o  
the  union's init ial  s t rategy of community organizing. First ,  the  boycott  strategy had 
begun a'16se some of its viability. Li t t le  had changed in te rms  of the  visibility (and 
t h e r e f o r e  potential~vulnerability) of  c o r p o r a t e  f i r m s  wi th  ma jo r  investments  in 
boycott*ble products, p a r t i c u k t w  among the  very- 'hrgest  firms. Y e t ,  t h e  b o y c o t t  
had  n o t  p roven  universally successful-the case of le t tuce  remained unclear and was 
fur ther  muddled by the  T e a m s t e r  (a.nd g rower )  c l a i m  t h a t  the i r ' s  was,  a f t e r  a l l ,  
"union" l e t t u c e .  Among t h e  less v i s i b l e  f i rms ,  t h e  intrasigence of growers was 
grea te r  and, having found alliance with larger firms through industry-wide agreements 
with t h e  T e a m s t e r s ,  many hardened their opposition. Others suggested they would 
reduce their production of le t tuce and other vegetable crops for a year or two (even 
if i t  meant  some financial 'loss) in order t o  wait  ou t  the  demise of the  UFW. 
At the  same time, the boycott  o rganiza t ions  in t h e  c i t i e s  began  t o  weaken .  
Compounding the  difficulty in understanding t h e  rules and regulations of each boycott 
(cf., Friedland and Thomas, 1974: 59) was the  stop-go, on-off again character  of the  
UFW boycott. Within a period' of several months in 1972, Chavez began the l e t t uce  
boycot t ,  called i t  off  when negotiations seemed feasible, restar ted i t ,  c a l l e d  i t  o f f ,  
etc. On occasion, boycott  organizations in t he  East were unsure of t h e  s t a t e  of the  
boycott;  even for knowledgeable UFW sympathizers ,  i t  w a s  ha rd  t o  know when t o  
consume  which products and when not. Furthermore, the  resources available t o  the 
urban boycot t  organizat ions-especial ly  t h e  c i i t i c a l -  l abor  o f  volunteers--began t o  
dwindle  a s  . t h e  student and anti-war movements lost steam. Though this is not the  
place t o  analyze the  decline of those movements, i t  is c l e a r  t h a t  t h e i r  d iminut ion  
reduced -he supply of labor from which the  UFW had previously- drawn. 
Second, the .loss of c o n t r a c t s  t o  t h e  T e a m s t e r s  d e a l t  a s e v e r e  blow t o  t h e  
a l r e a d y  be l eague red  UFW membership. Though few outward signs of lower morale' 
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were evident, the cos t s  of strike e f for t s  mounted. Even wi th  s u b s t a n t i a l  f i nanc ia l  
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  f r o m  individual-  un ions  ( such  as t h e  UAW and ILwU) and continuing 
support from t h e  AFL-CIO, t h e  union cou ld  n e i t h e r  a d e q u a t e l y  suppor t  s t r i k ing  
members  nor expec t  t o  weather a long boycott  campaign. with workersshifting from 
picket  lines to work in non-struck fields, t he  fear  of lost m o m e n t u m  a n d  decl ining 
membership triggered a renewed emphasis on the  kinds of social and support services 
t h e  union could provide in lieu of work or strike benefits. Service cente i s -  located in 
c e n t e r s  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  production shifted from being appendages to the  hiring halls 
and became ' loc i  of organizational'outreach (El Malcriado, Oct., 1973). Union s t a f f  
r enewed  t h e i r  r o l e  as counse lors  and  advocates  for families seeking welfare, food 
s tamps and housing. 
In response t o  collusion between the  Teamsters  and employers and the weakening' 
of the boycott  s t rategy,  the UFW embarked on a political -campaign t o  ou t f l ank  i t s  
oppos i t ion .  The  campa ign  cons i s t ed  of  t w o  par t s :  strong backing for Edmund G. 
Brown, 3.; liberal - Democratic candidate in the  1974 g u b e r n a t o r i a l -  e l e c t i o n s  and a 
s t a u n c h  s u p p o r t e r  of the  UFW, and advocacy of legislation which would- establish in 
California an independent Agricultural. Labor R e l a t i o n s  Board (ALRB) t o  superv ise  
s e c r e  t -ba l lo t  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l  elections. Though the  UFW-backed legislation (which 
was eventually enacted in 1975 with considerable 'help from the  victorious Brown). left 
the  union's right t o  boycott  virtually untouched, t h e  direction of t h e  shift was clear: 
t he  union would have t o  devote t h e  bulk of i t s  energy to organizing workers if i t  was 
t o  rec l i im lost ground in the rough elections. 
The s h i f t  b a c k  t o  organiz ing  workers--with t h e  e x p r e s s  i n t e n t  of winning 
e l e c t i o n n n d  extending the base of t he  union-proved remarkably successful. In the 
f i rs t  six months of t h e  ALRB's e x i s t e n c e  ( S e p t e m b e r ,  1975,  t o  Feb rua ry ,  1976),  
elections covering nearly-50,000 farm workers were conducted. The majority of these 
were initiated .by the UFW in i t s  a t t empt  t o  recover contracts  from the  Teamsters. 
Ove r  t h e  f i r s t  y e a r ,  t h e  UFW ob ta ined  a success r a t e  of 82.5% in recertification 
elections (against the  Teamsters) and new certification el ixt ions (Fuller and Mamer, 
1978: 144-5). Though a number of  e l e c t i o n s  werd  stalled by court contests and 
continued grower intrasigence, the  union had proven i t s  point:' given the opportunity, 
workers  seeking unionization would ' overwhelmingly-  choose the UFW. Backed by 
victories at the  polls and a change in Teamster leadership ,  t h e  UFW negot ia ted  a 
five-year jurisdictional -"trucen with the  Teamsters in 1977. 
The dilemmas of expansion. 
T h e  e l e c t o r a l  ' success  of invigorated t h e  organiza t ion  and provided f resh  
testimony to  the importance of maintaining c o n t a c t  in t h e  fields. Nonetheless, 
communi ty  organizing could not by itself overcome the difficulties associated with 
administration o f  contacts covering some  50,000 (and more) members.  Af ter  t h e  
first-blush of victory, the difficulties became apparent. By 1977, the  union had some 
180 separa te  con  t r a c t s  t o  adminis ter  in t h e  g rape ,  l e t t u c e ,  vegetable ,  t o m a t o ,  
s t r a w b e r r y  and nursery industries. Bargaining units ranged in size from 20 t o  2000 
workers. Some firms operated seasonally in a single production area; others operated 
on a year-round basis with ranches in several states. A small number of companies 
grew one or two different crops in which UFW members worked but others produced 
a mixed bag and thus needed a variety of workers with different skills. Beyond the 
variety of conditions e f fec t ing  c o n t r a c t  t e rms ,  . each  un i t  had i t s  own pa r t i cu la r  
history of grievances and complaints. Thus, the  contracts,  hiring halls and grievance 
procedures had t o  be initiated and developed t o  s u i t  loca l  condi t ions  a s  we l l  a s  
c o n f o r r l r r o  g e n e r a l  rules. Across t h e  r ange  of c o n t r a c t s ,  t h e  union faced the 
problem of creating some uniformity in the practice o f  . con t rac t  adminis t ra t ion ,  i f  
A - 
0n1j"-to-simp-fify&=enormws headaches associated with contract=-violations;. seniority; - - - -  --  
medical 'benefits and pension claims. 
The pressure for centralization and bureaucratization of contract  administration 
increased with organizatiordl . e-kpansion. Employers, while pleading special conditions 
as a d e f e n s e  a g a i n s t  t h e  establishment of a master  agreement ,  demanded a greater  
degree of  continuity from t h e  union. Most h a v e ,  a t  o n e  t i m e  o r  a n o t h e r ,  r a i l ed  
a g a i n s t  t h e  ."social r n o ~ e m e n $ ' ~  charac te r  of t h e  union, especially ' i t s  appearance of 
lacking an appropriate chain of command capable of  providing a p r e d i c t a b l e  set o f  
- 
a c t o r s  a n d  po l i c i e s  w i th  which t o  dea l .  T h e  i n e f f i c i e n c i e s  o f  t h e  hir ing hall, 
especially in the  early years of i t s  operation, were constantly pointed t o  by employers 
as a n  ind ica t ion  of  t h e  inab i l i t y  of t h e  UFW t o  a c t  responsibly. More generally, 
growers have fought to constr ic t  the t e r r a i n  o f  nego t i a t i on  t o  m o r e  t r ad i t i ona l ly  
accepted issues-especially wages and hours-while . union representatives (in and out  of 
. . cont rac t  negotiations) have sought to open t a k s  to a much broader range of topics, 
including:  p e s t i c i d e  u s e  a n d  protections,  changes in work organization, employment 
preference for seniority workers, supervision .and management rights w i th  r e s p e c t  t o  
the  introduction of new production technologies. 
I While some of these problems may b e  simply the  product of t h e -  "newness" o f  
un ioniza t ion  a n d  t h e  r e l a t i v e  ignorance  o f  b o t h  s ides  in t h e  p r a c t i c e  of  labor 
rkb t ion i ,  a dilemma underlies the union's situation. On the  one hand, t he  range of 
c o n t r a c t s  a n d  t h e  c o m p l e x i t y  of  c o n t r a c t  provisions have compelled the union t o  
central ize .the administration and negotiation o f  contracts  in i t s  na t iona l  leadersh ip .  
This  h a s  been  bui l t 'upon the  key role played by Chavez and the core  leadership of 
the  UFW during the  early period of mobilization a n d  dur ing  t h e  fa r - f lung  b o y c o t t  
c a m p a i g m .  With C h a v e z  a n d  t h e  core leadership serving first  as the  directors of 
these  campaigns a r id -k t e r ,  when cont rac t  tdlks followed union c e r t i f i c a t i o n ,  as t h e  
- - .-- - -  .---- - -- 
pr inc ipa l "  c o n t r a c t  negot iators ,  t h e  union could- effectively present a uniform set of 
demands to einployers, as well as establish at least a modicum of the predictability 
in nego t i a t i on  which employers demanded. Similarly, Chavez's penchant for wanting 
t~ maintain s t r ic t  cont r6 l -over  t h e  administration of union a f f a i r s 4 l b e i t  t o  p r o t e c t  
t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of  t h e  membership from the creation of  an intervening bureaucracy- 
t r a n s k t e d  into a further centralization of t he  administrative apparatus. Because the  
new contracts  convered such a broad territory and the new programs crea ted  such a 
p l e t h o r a  o f  pape rwork ,  handl ing  m a t t e r s  at  t h e  l e v e l - o f  e a c h  ~ l o c d l ' p r e s e n t e d  
significant problems of staffing and training. 
On t h e  o t h e r  hand ,  however ,  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  a t t a c h e d  t o  a n  ideo logy  o f  
c o m m u n i t y  a n d  t o  t h e  p r a c t i c e  o f  communi ty  organizing combined t o  promote an 
orientation toward more thorough membership involvement  in union a f f a i r s .  He re ,  
t o o ,  p r e c e d e n t  had  b e e n  set: ' in  e s t ab l i sh ing  l o c a l  i e p r e s e n t a  t i on ,  a n  e l abo ra t e  
s t ructure of ranch (company) commit tee  had been crea ted  to invest a s  many members 
a s  poss ib le  in d e b a t e s  o v e r  l o c a l  'and n a t i o n a l  union pol icy.  Pcior  t o  c o n t r a c t  
negotiations, marathon meetings were held at t h e ' l o c 8 l ~ l e v e l '  t o  in form n e g o t i a t i n g  
commit tees  of member's goa ls ' and  needs. On numerous occasions, particularly in the  
early rounds of negotiation, Chavez wotjld expand negotiating t eams  so tha t  fifty or  
one-hundred worke r s  cou ld  c o n f r o n t  company r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  direct ly  with their 
demands. 
While' i t  would' b e  premature t o  suggest t h a t  t h e  UFW has  veered from i t s  social 
movement origins into a more traditional- t r a d e  union o rgan iza t ion ,  i nd ica t ions  a r e  
t h a t  - t h e  union has suffered many of t he  growing pains experienced by older unions. 
Ef for t s  to diminish the  gap between leadership and membership have increasingly been 
, 
partitioned. into t h e  poltical government of the union through an emphasis on member 
input just prior t o  cont rac t  negotiations: symbolIically in t h e  f o r m  of  m e m b e r s  as 
-advisors  - t o -nego t i a t i ng  c o m m i t t e e s ,  a n d  i n t e r m i t t e n t l y '  as representatives t o  t he  
1 
national-convention. Contract  administration and t h e  day-to-day bus ines s  of  union 
affairs,  however, has  come t o  constitute the  -"other-" government of t he  union-through 
. . 
an increasing specialization of records, and a g rea t e r  emphasis on t h e  t i e s  b e t w e e n  
1-1 'union s ta f f  ( the equivaleirt of business agents) and-  t h e  national lieadquarters. 
If t h e  UFW has been the subject of increased reports  of  dissension, pa r t  of the  
e x p l a n a t i o n  f o r  i nne r  t u r m o i l  r e s t s  wi th  Chavez ' s  e f f o r t s  t o  s tem t h e  movement 
toward more traditional.  t rade unionism. Chavez; paradoxicilly, has h e b e d  s t i m u h t e  
the  turmoil: 'his e f fo r t s  t o  diminish the importance of t h e  bureaucratic apparatus has  
led t o  arbitrary d i s m i d l s  and purges in both l o e l  ' and national ' leadership and staff 
which h a v e  a l i e n a t e d  some  s t a f f  and  impeded t h e  functioning of t he  union.  i is 
tendency t o  intervene at a l l  levels of administration in order t o  insure i t s  consistency 
with the  goals ' of t h e  union has also created an aura of autocracy and a belief among 
some rank and file t h a t  the  locals a r e  not t o  b e  t rusted by the  national-union. 
T h e  d i s p u t e  be tween loca l  autonomy and the tendency toward-central i ia t ion,  a 
major issue in t he  most recent le t tuce s t r i k e  (1978-79), h a s  led o n e  purged  l o c a l '  
o f f i c i a l  t o  compla in :  "The United Farm Workers is t he  only'union I know of where 
there  is no concept  of a union 10-1; everything comes  from Cesar" (cited in Lindsey, 
1979). Ano the r  f o r m e r  UFW s taf f  member (now with an  independent farm worker 
union in Arizona) added: "In the UFW, everything i s  very centralized, very dictatoriaJn 
(cited in Lindsey, 1979). 
The dilemma of centralization versus l k a l  autonomy thus -has i t s  origins in two 
sets of factors. First ,  union expansion in a highly variegated industry has created a 
set o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  p rob lems  which f a r  o u t s t r i p  t h e  c a p a c i t y  of  a communal 
o r g a n i z a w  .to manage effectively. In an e f fo r t  to fulfil l  i t s  responsibilities wi th  
r e s p e c t  t o  i t s  m e m b e r s h i p  and with respect t o  i t s  con t r ac t  partners, t he  UFW has 
. -.: 
attempted--&ate cont rac t  negotiation and administration in - a quasi-bureaucrat ic , .  - -- -- 
centralized apparatus. But, second, t h e  union has committed itself t o  an organizing 
approach which emphasizes the communa~'characteristics o f  t h e  o rgan iza t ion  as a 
68 
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means by which to successfully expand into new enterprises and industries. In ' light 
o f  d imin i shed  e x  t e r n a  1 resources--financial'.and human-the strategy of community 
organizing has proven immene ly  important. T h e  r e su l t i ng  c o n f l i c t  b e t w e e n  t h e s e  
fac tors  has  at t imes been tempered by the  force of  Chavez's symbolic and historical 
importance to t h e  union; at other t imes, however, Chavez's e f for t s  t o  close the  gap 
b e t w e e n  UFW, t h e  t rade union, and UFW, t h e  social  movement, have only' worsened 
the  situation. 
The Present  Challenge: 'Undocumented Workers and Machines 
Two fundamental 'and related problems pose t h e  g r e a t e s t  cha l l enge  t o  f u t u r e  
f a r m  worke r  o rgan iza t ion ,  particularly- for t he  United Farm Workers: undocumented 
workers and the  threa t  of labor diqjlacement through mechanization. On one side, a 
principle' obstacle t o  the regularization of employment and increased wages resides in 
t h e  union's inability to restrict  access t o  employment t6 citizen/documented workers-- 
those who have some measure of protection under existing labor laws. On the other 
side, t h e  e b s t i c i t y  of the supply of undocumented workers and their 'vulrierability t o  
e x p l o i t a t i o n  make  it possible for employers to maintain highly' labor intensive forms 
o f  production and t o  augment their contrdl . v i a  t h e  manipula t ion  of  undocumented  
worke r s .  T o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  t h e  union finds a means by which t o  strengthen i ts  
con t ro l '  o v e r  t h e  supply of  labor  and  t h e r e b y  i n c r e a s e s  i t s  e f f o r t s  t o  d e c r e a s e  
employc+-control o v e r  t h e  t e r m s  a n d  c o n d i t i o n s  of  employment,  i t  increases t h e  
possibility t h a t  employers will turn t o  mechanized production, which for many crops i s  
b 4
. . - sither-a~_ail&le- .or--on the  drawing boards. The dilemma .is graphically:. i l luitrated -b.y. ._ a _ - . . 
jux'taposition o f  quotes from interviews c o n d u c t e d  by o n e  of  t h e  a u t h o r s  during a 
s t u d y  o f  t h e  l e t t u c e  indus t ry  in 1979: When a s k e d  wha t  probleins undocumented 
workers presented for the union, o n e  w o r k e r  ( a  UFW m e m b e r  s i n c e  1970 and  a n  
a rden t  supporter of  Chavez) replied: I 
When you a s k  w h a t  1 th ink  a b o u t  t h e  indocumentado (undocumented worker) 
thing, I have t o  b e  honest. We cannot g e t  anywhere-with the contracts,  with 
s e n i o r i t y ,  w i t h  good representa t ion- -unt i l  ' t h e  indocumentados a r e  o u t  of t he  
fields. As long as you have guys trembling because t h e y  a r e  a f r a i d  o f  be ing  
deported, you can't expect  t o  pro tec t  jobs or  make the  work more human 
From the  other  s ide ,  a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  t h e  Western  Growers  Assoc ia t ion ,  t h e  
principle association of vegetable- growers in labor affairs), summarized the issue this 
way: 
T h e  state of  ~ a ' l i f o r n i a  h a s  t o  choose between two things: 1biv food costs  or 
unemployment. They only way we a r e  going t o  k e e p  food c o s t s  down--if w e  
close off t he  border-is through mechanization. ... You can mechanize harvesting 
and double your output per hour and reduce your labor force t o  a b o u t  25% o f  
i t s  present size. But, t o  do tha t ,  you've got  ' t o  eliminate the  illegals. 
Though f e w  union o r  e m p l o y e r  representa t ive ' s  - l i n k  u n d o c u m e n t e d  l a b o r  a n d  
mechanization so expl ic i th  , i t  remains clear  t h a t  the  availability . of w lnerable labor 
a f f e c t s  the  character  of labor relations and the options faced by the UFW. 
T h e c a s e o f  lettuce. , 
T h e  l e t t u c e  industry provides a ;ignificant case in point. Though this analysis 
will necessarily have t o  b e  brief, there are d r e e  reasons why t h e  l e t t u c e  indus t ry  
case  is suggestive: f i rs t ,  t he  UFW has made substantial-gains in t he  industry (roughly' 
7 out of 10 le t tuce  workers belong to the  uFw); second, previous research indicates ' 
t h a t  a s ign i f i can t  chunk of t h e  harvest labor force is undocumented (Thomas, 1981, 
es t imates  t ha t  perhaps a s  much a s  one-third ,of the k b o r  force kicks documentation); 
a n d ,  thitd-, t h e  l e t t u c e  indus t ry  h a s  at its d i sposa l  t h e  technology necessary to 
undertake a - reGtiveIy rapid shift t o  harvest mechanization (cf ., Friedland, Barton and 
- -- - - - -- - ---- - -- 1 
Thomas ,  1981: Ch. 3, f o r  a d e t a i l e d  descripti& of t h e  -technique a6d i t s  history). 
Though the  union made in roads through i t s  capacity t o  win representatio~l~elections, 
i t  h a s  b e e n  f o r c e d  t o  s t r i k e  a p r e c a r i o u s  b a l a n c e  b e t w e e n  challenging employer 
cont ro l 'over -=or  recruitment,  work organizat ion a n d  e a r n i n g s  .and  bowing t o  t h e  
th rea t  of mechanization and Iiige-s'cale - disphcement  of i t s  members. 
Thus, the union's very success in .organizing le t tuce  workers has, ironiciilfy, put 
it in a very sticky position. The union cannot  seek to regulate labor supply without 
splintering its organiza t iona l -  b a s e  in t h e  h a r v e s t  . l abor  f o r c e  a n d  weakening  t h e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  it h a s  f o s t e r e d  wi th  o t h e r  e l e m e n t s  o f  t h e  Hispanic  communi ty .  
Regulating-labor supply, in terms of limiting membership t o  documented and  c i t i z e n  
workers would' enable'  t he  UFW t o  increase i t s  ability t o  police cont rac ts  and to  make 
legal.  c laims against employers based on t he  political . rights and ent i t lements  of legal 
r e s i d e n t s .  The  UFW h a s  had  s o m e  s u c c e s s  in convincing the  ALRB t o  apply the  
principle of t reat ing workers a s  union members f i r s t  and  n a t i o n a l .  c i t i z e n s  second.  
However, interviews with workers and lower level union s taff  make it c lear  t ha t  the  
vulnerability of undocumented workers continues to act as a p o w e r f u l  ' d e t e r r e n t  t o  
t h e i r  f i l ing  of grievances and unfair labor pract ice charges (cf., Thomas, 1981: 140- 
45). More importantly, e f for t s  to screen out undocumented workers  would i n c r e a s e  
t e n s i o n s  b e t w e e n  d o c u m e n t e d  a n d  undocumen ted  workers .  As suggested earlier,  
undocumented  worke r s  c o n s t i t u t e  a s i g n i f i c a n t  po r t ion  of  t h e - l a b o r  f o r c e  and ,  
therefore,  of t h e  union's membership. Many a r e  relatives,  compadres o r  comadres of 
union members .  Shou ld  t h e  u n i o n  s e e k  t o  d e n y  m e m b e r s h i p  a n d  w o r k  t o  
undocumen ted  workers ,  i t  would '  d i r ec t ly '  challenge those t i e s  and, in t he  process, 
contradict  the  union's historical sblidarity around ethnicity and national.  heritage. 
The--impacts of t h e  UFWts actions with regard to undocumented workers extend 
beyond t h e  immediate orgaizationi3l.boundaries of the union. Two outside groups must 
- - -- - - b e ~ m i - d e r e d  - i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  question of  regulating labor supply: non-union and 
non-UFW workers, on one side; and other Hispanic and Chicano organizations on the  
other. A pivotal set of events  can  lend some insight into the significance of these 
groups. During t h e ' k t e  spring and  eafly summer o f  1979, Chayez and representatives 
of t h e  UFW made ca l l s ' t o  Immigration and ~ a t u r a l i z a t i o n  Service commissioner Lionel 
Cast ' i l lo a n d  C a r t e r  Admin i s t r a t i on  s t a f f  i n  a n  e f f o r t  to d e a l  ' w i t h  e m p l o y e r  
i m p o r t a t i o n  o f  s t r i keb reake r s .  In p a r t i a l  r e s p o n s e  to pressure brought from the  
Car t e r  Administration, t he  Border Patrbl '(which fa l l s  unde r  t h e  jur isdict ion of  t h e  
INS) b e e f e d  up  its s t a f f  in t h e  sou the rn  a n d  c e n t r a l  v a l l e y s  of  Ca l i fo rn i a  and 
increased raids of f rui t  and vegetable  r a n c h e s  (Sa l inas  Ca l i fo rn i an ,  5/7/79). T h e  
i m m e d i a t e  e f f e c t s  of t h i s  q u i t e  , d r a m a t i c  a c t i o n  w e r e  pronounced: several firms 
suffered n e a r ~ o m p l e t e  (though temporary) work shutdowns.  During t h e  month o f  
March (19791, nea r ly  52,000 undocumen ted  a l i e n s  w e r e  apprehended in the state 
-(Salinas a l i f o m i a n ,  4/18/79). Although the  raids were temporary and ceased before 
t h e  s t r i k e  e n d e d ,  t h e  consequences for t h e  UFW were important: employers' illegal 
strikebreaking tac t ics  were publicized nationally and several - firms experienced painful 
financial Setbacks. 
However, many workers outside the  UFW ranks reac ted  negatively- t o  the  union's 
action. On severdl'occasions, workers with whom one of t he  authors worked in the  
f i e l d s  e x p r e s s e d  the i r  dismay t h a t  the  UFW wou-Id' work hand-in-hand with la ~ i g r a  
( t he  Border Patrol).  While UFW o r g a n i z e r s  s o u g h t  t o  just i fy t h e  s t r a t e g y  a s  a 
temporary measure, t he  negative consequences were  qui te  clear. As one former UFW 
sympathizer (who worked at a company sti l l  under Teamster contact)  told me: 
Most o f  t h e  guys  who have been scabbing have never heard of Chavez. They 
come from way down south (in Mexico) a n d  just  c o m e  h e r e  t o  make  a f e w  
bu*. B u t  c a n  you imagine what they are goint t o  think of a guy who ge ts  
you deported one minute and then wants your union dues the  next? 
A r e l a t i v e l y -  s m a l l  sample of interviews and observations cannot provide a sweeping 
. - - - .  ---. - - -  - -  . - - -- .- - - -- -. ---- -- -  - ... - - 
generalization about  the ex ten t  of such sentiments,  but i t  may be safely assumed t h a t  
t h e  Borde r  P a t r o l  inc ident  wi l l  n o t  qu ick ly  b e  f o r g o t t e n  among  po ten t i a l  UFW 
members. As -the 'UFW enters  a period a f t e r  the expiration of its--"peace settkmentll  
with the  Teamsters, the  Teamsters can b e  expected to- exploit the  incident for their 
own ends should they decide to reenter the competition for r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  of f a r m  
workers. 
Equally important, the  UFW's dealings with the  Border Patrol. in the  summer of 
1979 drew fire from other farm worker organizations. Two of those  organiza t ions ,  
the  Texas Farm Workers Unnion and the Maricopa County Organizing Project (MCOP), 
both of which were developed by former UFW organizers who ' lef t  or  were  purged 
f r o m  t h e  C a l i f o r n i a  un ion ,  have  sought  expl ic i t ly '  t o  c r e a t e  liaison between 
documented and undocumented workers. The UFW action deepened the long-standing 
rift .  In response t o  the  Border Patrol raids, an official 'of MCOP wrote t o  Chavez: 
We must urge you t o  stop a l l  a c t i o n s  t h a t  would c r e a t e  a g r e a t e r  division 
among t h e  workers.  If t h e  United F a r m  Workers Union has problems with 
undocumented workers being brought in as scabs, the  answer is to organize these 
scabs ,  -like we do any o t h e r  scab  t h a t  comes in t o  break our strike (Salirias 
Californian, 5/1/79) 
While- the vehemence of MCOP1s response can b e  partially attributed to  the extremity 
of the  UFW1s action, this highlights the extent  of the organization problems fac ing 
t h e  UFW (or TFW and MCOP) in their efforts  t o  extend beyond regional farm worker 
organizing. 
Employers, not surprisingly, have been- quite adept at whipsawing the  UFW with 
the  issue of undocumented workers and t h e  t h r e a t  of mechanizat ion.  Wrapping 
t h e m s e l v e s  in t h e  cloak of agricultural-exceptionalism and riding the crest  of the  
r e s u r r e c ~ i s s e z  faire ide6logy of the present Administration, many have attempted 
to kiy the  responsibility for dealing with undocumented immigration at someone else's 
-- feet.-- -The=executive director-of Western Growers Associatiton argued in an interview 
that :  
I don't think that  the responsibility for handling the issue of i l legal~aliens should 
bg-pu t  on t he  grower's back. It's not our fault tha t  there's high unemployment 
in Mexico. It's not our fault that  the state and federal .government can't keep 
t h e m  f r o m  g e t t i n g  a c r o s s  t h e  border. It's n o t  our fault tha t  they can get 
fraudulent documentation. Why should w e  b e  t h e  only ones  responsible fo r  
them?...Hell, w e  get most  of our  workers  through union hiring halls. Why 
doesn't Chavez clean up his act? 
Just  as t h e y  por t r ayed  themselves a s  the hapleSs victims of a jurisdictional 'dispute 
between the  UFW and t h e  T e a m s t e r s  a decade  e a r l i e r ,  employers  now disclaim 
responsibi l i ty f o r  t h e  operations of the  labor market-while lobbying to ensure tha t  
legijlation which seeks t o  penalize employers  for  hir ing undocumented workers is  
defeated. 
A t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e ,  t h e  mechanica l  l e t t u c e  h a r v e s t e r  is  kept visible on the 
sidelines, pictured a s  available a t  any moment t o  replace recalcitrant labor. A study 
carried out  recently by Friedland, Barton and Thomas (1981) focused directly. on' the 
question of  mechanization and its consequences in the lettuce industry. Their major 
conclusions a r e  s ignif icant:  if employed in an economic  fashion, the  mechanical 
harvester would displace between 50% and 83% of the  harvest ' l a o r  force in ' let tuce 
within f ive  y e a r s  o f  i t s  in t roduct ion;  mechaniza t ion  would- drastically'alter work 
organization in the havest (including a significant de-skilling of most ha rves t  ' l abor) ;  
and t h a t  t h e  loss of jobs would directly af fec t  the  viab-ility of the  UFW, especially 
given i t s  concentration in the - let tuce industry. This projective anaMsis of the social- 
consequences  technological 'change and a more explicit analysis of the  labor process 
conducted by one of the  authors (Thomas, 1981) argued tha t  he principle obstacle t o  
m e c h a n i z a t i o n  w a s  t h e  shee r  ef f ic iency,  product iv i ty  and,  mos t  impor tan t ly ,  
adaptability of the present system of labor recruitment and.  utilization--one organized 
LI 
around t h e  availab-ility of an elai t ic  supply of highly- vuhierable labor, undocumented 
workers. - - .. -- - -  -- .- - - C 
The t h r e a t  of mechaniza t ion  is not ,  however ,  limited to lettuce production. 
Over the  past twenty-five years, research and development of mechani-1-devices for 
various phases of  production (cultivation, p lant ing  and t ransplant ing ,  weeding and 
harvesting) have been carried out  for a wide range of-crops. At present, mechanical 
harvesters have been tested and/or implemented for the following crops: processing 
t o m a t o e s ,  f r e s h  m a r k e t  tomatoes ,  wine and  t a b l e  and raisin g r a p e s ,  l e t t u c e ,  
cauliflower, onions, apples and ci trus (Cargill and Rossmiller, 1968; Hightower, 1973; 
and Scheuring and  ~ h o m ~ i o n ,  1978). In other words, harvest mechanization could. 
conceivably eliminate more than half the demand for agriculfural' labor in t h e  nex t  
decade. .Equally' important, the  threat  of mechanization as either a negotiating or a 
union-busting device is by no means an abstract entity for the United Farm Workers 
union. 
Alternatives for the  United Farm Workers. 
At the surface, i t  would seem t h a t  a b leak  f u t u r e  a w a i t s  the  United Farm 
Workers union. Despite the relitively strong position the union has achieved in the 
let tuce and grape industries and t h e  advances  i t  has  made through s e c r e t  ba l lo t  
e l e c t i o n s  in o t h e r  commodity groups, i t  is confronted on one side by the potential 
loss of jobs to mechanization and, on the other side, by t h e  cont inued debi l i ta t ing  
ro le  played by undocumented labor. One major alternative consists of efforts to 
negotiate some form of compensation for  workers  d isplaced by mechanization--an 
alternative which presupposes tha t  the UFW continues to  press for higher wages and 
greater  control 'over  access t o  employment. The other major alternative consists of 
efforts  t o  widen the  organizational base of the  union by establishing durable' linkages 
to other-action groups, most  notably c iv i l  r i g h t s  (Hispanic), consumer and labor  
organizations, in order t o  generate support external t o  agriculture and to a t tempt  to  
nullify -the present tension between ci t izen/documented workers  and undocumented 
workers. The relative advantages of  the two alternatives need t o  b e  elaborated. 
Compensation for mechanization. 
. . 
Under present circumstances and within the structure of ag r iWl tu~ l 'p roduc t ion ,  
the UFW has insufficient leverage to ext rac t  from erriployers, in the  lettuce industry 
or e l e w h e r e ,  a negotiated compensation and/or retraining package.  The consumer 
b o y c o t t ,  a major lever  in t h e  pas t ,  h a s  lost much of its potency. Even in those 
situations in which wsubstitutablew~commodities e x i s t ,  t h e  UFW will  have  g r e a t  
difficulty in developing a set of boycott organizations and making a boycott 
work. Though i t  could come t o  pass that  urban audiences may once  again become 
a c c e s s i b l e '  as a r e su l t '  of  economic  depression and political protest, a t  the present 
t ime the  union cannot expect t o  be able t o  r e s u r r e c t  t h e  boyco t t  ac t ion  with a s  
much vigor a s  i t  did in t h e  l a t e  1960s and early-  1970s. The shortcomings of the 
let tuce boycott o f  1978-79 provides sufficient evidenoe for tha t  argument (Bernstein, 
1982). While' the  boycott has proven less  than satisfactory, strikes have proven more .€ 
effective; but, in order to make a strike work, the  union must somehow close  o f f  
g rower  access '  t o  a l t e r n a t i v e  supplies of labor. Such an end can only- b e  achieved 
through a much stronger position with respect to undocumented workers. Though the  
UFW h a s  al legedly.  a t t e m p t e d  its own form of border control in the past (Lindsey, 
1979), there is no reason to expect tha t  the  union can accomplish what  t h e  .Border  
Patrol  'cannot, i.e., effectively. closing off the  1000-mile- border with Mexico. It would 
necessarily mean a stronger'liaison with the  .INS and the  Border Pa t ro l '  and backing 
for  t h e  a l r eady  unpopular "random" B p r d e i  P a t r o l  raids on businesses, stores and 
private residences. 
The-costs of alliance with the INS would. b e  staggering. The rifts which already 
separate the' UFW from other groups, particularly other farm worker organizations and 
- 
Hispanic civil rights ~rganiza t ions ,  would ' undoubtedly - grow wider --in a- period-in which 
the  growth of the  Hispanic popuktion in t h e  U.S. h a s  a c c e l e r a t e d  and socia l '  and 
economic discrimination against Hispanics has increased. To actively ' take a stand for 
more res t r ic t ive  immigra t ion  pol icy  (and ,  neces sa r i l y ,  f o r  m o r e  e n f o r c e m e n t  o f  
immigra t ion  laups) would only contr ibute  to t h e  mechanisms through which Hipan ic s  
a r e  set a p a r t  soc ia l ly  a n d  economica l ly  ( p a r t i c u l a r l y  in  t e r m s  o f  e m p l o y  m e n  t 
oppor tuni t ies ) .  I t  would'alsd support t he  argument  made by conservative politicians 
(and, unfortunately, some trade union leaders) t h a t  i l legal 'aliens are taking jobs from 
Americans when, as we argued earlier in t h e  paper,  those jobs have been predicated 
on t he  avaihbi l i ty  of disadvantaged workers. Besides distancing itself from poten'ti81- 
all ies outside of t h e  k b o r  movement in agriculture,  t he  UFW would'diminish i t s  own 
chances for expansion into regions where f a r m  worke r  o rgan iza t ion  h a s  a n l y  just  
begun. If the  reactions of the  TFW and MCOP a r e  any indication of t he  opposition 
t o  t he  UFW1s t ac t i c  of rooting out  undocumented strikebreakers, then the obstacles t o  
successful~~organization utside the confines of California and corps employing large 
numbers of documented workers will likely b e  qui te  large. The skepticism of workers 
o u t s i d e  t h e  UFW (ep i tomized  by t h e  r e m a r k s  of t h e  worker quoted earlier) wou'ld. 
undoubtedly  m a k e  organiz ing  rough going  f o r  t h e  union should i t  a t t e m p t  t o  
d i s t i n g u i s h  b e t w e e n  " a c c e p t a b l e "  ( c i t i z e n / d o c u m e n t e d )  a n d  nunacceptable"  
(undocumented) workers. 
T h e  p o t e n t i a l  consequences  o f  a n  exp-l ic i t ly  anti-indocumentado s trategy for 
in te r rd l ' a f fa i r s  of the  union have been discussed s o m e w h a t  in  e a r l i e r  s e c t i o n s  b u t  
d e s e r v e  some  a d d i t i o n a l  a t t e n t i o n .  Given'  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a portion of the  UFWts 
membership in key industries (especially -lettuce, but more crops a s  well, particularly 
du r ing  p e r i o d s  in which the immigration of undocumented workers increases, eg., in 
t h e  wake of economic downturns in Mexico a n d  o t h e r  La t in  Amer i can  na t ions)  is 
- -.- ---undocumented -or is . t ied by family or social t i e s  t o  undocumented workers, a move t o  
close+ff access t o  indocumentados would widen splits in the  membership. Acceding 
t o  t h e  wishes of t h a t  small segment of t h e  membership which feels itself threatened 
. . -- - 
by undocumented workers might shore up their support, but it would Also * l e a d  t o  a 
con t rad ic t ion  o f  o n e  of  t h e  major bases  of  solidarity in the  union: ethnicity and 
common c u l t u ~ l  'heritage. 
An a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  negot ia t ion  with employers  over  compensat ion  for  job 
displacement might consist of appeals t o  the  state and fedel-gl governments t o  provide 
- 
a n  equ iva len t  package  o f  amel io ra t ive  programs.  This has been a rather visible 
avenue already undertaken by the UFW: particularly in the form of the in t roduct ion  
o f  legis la t ion  in Cal i fornia  t o  c r e a t e  a fund for  compensation and retraining for 
displaced farm workers (Salinas Californian, 2/17/79). Basing their a rgument  on t h e  
importance of agriculture to  the state's economy and the importance of farm workers 
t o  agriculture, the  union has  sought  t o  c i r cumven t  i t s  weakness in deal ing with 
employers by trying a political' route. Thus far, the  union has not heen successful in 
i t s  efforts:' increased grower  lobbying in t h e  state l eg i s l a tu re  and t h e  declining 
in f luence  of t h e  union's pr inc ipal  supporter ,  Governor Brown, have stymied UFW- 
backed propos8ls. One particularly powerfiil- argument, especially in an e ra  of wage 
concessions, business failures and --'(tax consciousnessw, used by growers and their allies 
has centered upon t h e  r6 le  of Mexicans, documented and undocumented,  in t h e  
Ca l i fo rn ia  economy: tha t  any effort  t o  force compensation (either through individual 
employers or through a compensation po6l created by a tax on farm equipment) would 
only increase subsidization of  foreign nationals-including 'those who -"t&ken jobs from 
Americans. Beyond the specific case of agriculture, employers generally have baked  
at p o l i t W . e f f o r t s  t o  ameliorate the e f fec t s  of technological'change. An action with 
regard to f a r m  workers  would undoubtedly b e  seen  a s  es tabl i sh ing a dangerous 
- -. - -  - - 
precedent. 
Widening the  organizational base. 
R a t h e r  than  increasing the risks of broadening-cleavages within its membership 
-- 
over issues of c- i t i tenship  and mechanizat ion,  . t he  UFW cai seek ' to  broaden i t s  
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  base and,  t h e r e f o r e ,  its c a p a c i t y  for  po l i t i ca l  a c t i o n  through a 
combination of aggressive organizing among farmworkers and strengthening a l l i ances  
with o t h e r  e t h n i c  and labor  groups. One potentially-divisive factor-the issue of 
undocumented workers--can no . longer b e  ski r ted .  R a t h e r  t h a n  maintain a double 
s t andard  wi th  r ega rd  t o  ihdocumentados, the  UFW must. actively-join with Hispanic 
civi l . r ights  groups and unions, such a s  the ILGWU (cf., Los Angeles Times, 11/14/78; 
and Ear ly ,  19821, f i r s t  t o  ac t ive ly -d raw indocumentados into the organization and, 
second, t o  combat the ideology and p r a c t i c e  of d iscr iminat ion  aga ins t  Hispanics 
generally; 
In following the  lead of the  Ladies Garment Workers Union, the  UFW can seek 
t o  protect  the workplace rights accorded indocumentados under the existing ALRB and 
capitalize on their right to vote a s  a means by which to win contracts. Until- such 
t ime as the union, rather than employers, comes t o  be  recognized a s  the protector of 
indocu.mentados, the  same sort of paternalism which enables employers t o  appear a s  
benefactors -("..giving jobs to illegals and protecting them from the  Border Patroln. a s  
one foreman pu t  in Thomas's study (1981: Ch. 5)) will continue to  operate against the  
union. The UFW, with i ts  past experience in the  organization of  a broad range  o f  
social ~services,would ' b e  ideally suited to provide the  support needed by. undocumented 
workers in their relittions with employers, primarily, but alSo wi th- landlords ,  police,  
storeowners and public bureaucracies. 
But,-because the issue of undocumented workers extends far beyond agriculture, 
the union would necessarily find its goals consistent with the array of Hispanic civil 
-r ights  -g roups -  and  unions opera t ing  in t h e  c i t i e s  and in other industries. As the  
Hispanic population in the United States has grown over the  p a s t  two  decades ,  t h e  
proportional' representation of Hispanics in secondary labor markets and urban ghettos 
has' alSo increased. Civil ' r ights groups seeking t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  r i g h t s  o f  Hispanics  
h a v e  found themsel i+s whipsawed by e m p l o j e r s  and politicians in much the  same 
fashion as the  UFW. -"Illega1'aliensW'are pointed to as a clandest ine invasion f o r c e  
w h i c h  steals' job o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f r o m  t h e  unemployed  whi le .  d ra in ing  communi ty  
resources through the unauthorized use of social ' services .  While f e w  s t u d i e s  h a v e  
- 
a c t u a l l y  d o c u m e n t e d  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  job loss or  resource drain (much less accurate  
e s t ima te s  of t he  number of undocumented aliens), the  idedlogy has posed a significant 
o b s t a c l e  t o  p rog res s ive  a c t i o n  fo r  Hispanics .  Most dangerously, i t  has  served t o  
c r e a t e  a suspicious, if not antagonistic,  v i ew  on t h e  p a r t  o f  publ ic  o f f i c i a l s ,  t h e  
m e d i a ,  s o m e  unions  a n d  Black a c t i o n  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  Hispanics  
generally. 
The creation of open and durable' alliances be tween '  t he  UFW and Hispanic civil 
r ights  groups cannot,  by itself, dismantle the  ideology of parasitism, but i t  can help 
t o  focus the  debate  more clearly on relations between unions and civil rights, on the  
one hand, and employers, on the  other. By combining energies t o  support and defend 
a l i e n s  who a r e  d rawn  i n t o  t h e  U.S. as worke r s ,  t h e  UFW a n d  o ther  groups can 
actively sires the interdependence of the W.S. and La t in  Amer i can  e c o n o m i e s  a n d  
popula t ions .  By portraying indocumentados a s  they actually a re ,  employees of U.S. 
firms, the UFW-Hispanic alliance can shift  t he  deba te  to one of employer abuse and 
away from alleged parasitism and indolence on the  pa r t  of Hispanics. 
Widening t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l ' b a s e  o f  t h e  UFW would a l s o  h a v e  s ign i f i can t  
advantag= for dealing with the issue of mechanization in agriculture. As long a s  the  
union cannot  bargain with employers from a position of strength, i t  c a n n o t  hope  to 
- .  
- - --extrac3-n advan tageous  compensationlretraining package. And, a s  long as i t s  e f for t s  
to establish a politi&l.solution are seen as posing a threa t  to employer rights, l i t t le  
headway can  b e  expected through legislation. Given these conditions, t h e  only option 
open to the union is one of aggressive organizing in the  fields. A strategy o f  
encircleinent,  intensive e f for t s  t o  win representational 'ekctions, can enhance the 
UFW's bargaining leverage only if the union can draw in the indocumentados. Again, 
a return to community organizing would lead the way. 
.-- References 
Aronowitz, Stahley. 1975. Fake Promise's. New York: Rand McNalTy. 
Bach, Robert. 1978. -"Mexican Immigration and the  American State," 
I n t e r n a t i o ~ l  Migration Review 42 (Winter):536-58. 
Baker, George. 1975. tvSta l ld  in the  Vineyards." Ramparts V. 13 ( ~ e c - J a n )  
Bernstein, Harry. 1982,-"Lettuce Strike Increased Grower Profits, Study 
Finds." Los Angeles Times (1 115182). 
Bonacich, Edna. 1973.. "A Theory of Middleman Minorities."' American 
Sociological Review. 38 (October): 583-94. 
Brown, Gerald. 1968. "The United Farm Workers and the Culture of Poverty." 
Latin American Studies. Cornell University. 
Burawoy, Michael. 1976, "Functions and Reproduction of Migrant Labo~." 
American Journal of Sociology. 8 I(5): 1050-87. 
Cargill, B.F.and G. Rossmiller (eds.). 1968. Fruit and Vegetable Harvest 
Mechanization. Rural Manpower Center: Michigan State University. 
Cook, Alice. 1962,- "Dual Government in Unions: A TMl for Analysis." 
Industrial-and Labor Relations Review, 15(3):323-49. 
Craig, Richard. 1971. The Bracero Program. Austin: University of 
Texas Press. 
Dunne, John. 1967. Dekino. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 
Early, Steve. 1982, "How t o  Organize Immigrant Labor-," The Nation. 
6/5/82, pp. 680-82. 
El Malcriado. Newspaper of the  United Farm Workers of America. 
Keene, California. 
Fellmeth, Robert C. 1973. Politics of Land. New York: Grossman. 
Fisher, Lloyd. 1953. Harvest Labor Markets in California. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
F r e d e r i u  Anne. 1978. -nCalifornia Agribusiness: A Case Study." Senior 
Thesis, Community Studies, University of California, Santa Cruz. 
Friedl&nd, W. H. (forthcoming) Monograph on social consequences of mech- - -- -4 annation in the Cglifomia grape industry. 
Friedkind, W. H. and Dorothy Nelkin, 1971. Migrant: Agricultural Workers 
in America's Northeast. New York: kit, Rinehart and Winston. 
Friedland, W.H. and R. J. Tho-&s. 1974, "Paradoxes of ~ g r i c u l h r a l  
Unionism in California." Society (May-June): 54-62. 
Friedland, W.H. and A.E. 0arton. 1975. Destalking the Wily Tomato: A Caw 
Study in the Social Consequences of California Agricultural Research. 
D a v k  University of a l i f o m i a ,  Department of Applied BehavioMI - - 
Sciences,. ~ e s e a i c h  Monograph -# 15: 
Friedland, W.H., A.E. Barton and R. J. Thomas. 198 1. - M a n u f a c ~ r i n g  Green 
in the  Let tuce  Industry. New 
Frundt, Henry. 1981. "The Forces and Reht ions  of  Food Processing in the  
United States,".paper presented to the  Conference on the  PoliticBl' 
Economy of Food and A g r i m l ~ r e  in the Advanced Industrial Societies, 
Guelph, Ontario, Canada - (August). 
Fuller, Varden. 1955. Labor Relations in Agriculture. Berkeley: Institute 
- of Industrial Relations, University of California. 
Fuller, Varden and John Mamer . 1978. -"Constraints on Farm Worker Unionization." 
Monthly Labor Review, 17(2): 143-55. 
Ga-hiza, Ernesto. 1964. Merchants of Labor. Santa Barbara: McNally . and 
Loftin. 
. 
G a k r z a ,  Ernesto. 1971. Spiders .in the  House and Workers in the Field; 
South Bend, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press. 
GlaSs, Judith C. 1968. Conditions Which Fadflitate Unionization of 
Agricultural Workers: A Case Study of the  Salinas Valley Lettuce 
Industry. Ph.D. dissertation, UCLA, Department of Economics. 
Granovetter , Mark. 1974. Getting a Job. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Hightower, James. 1973. Hard Tomatoes, Hard Times. New York: Schenkman. 
Jameison, Stuart. 1945. Labor Unionism in Agriculture. Washington, D.C.: 
Govern men t Printing Office. 
Jenkins, 3. Craig. 1975. Farm Workers and the Powers: Insurgency and 
Political ' Conflict, 1946-72. Ph.D. dissertation, S ta te  University of 
New York at Stony Brook. 
~ e n k i n s , y  Craig and Charles Perrow. 1977. "Insurgency of the  PowerleSs: 
Farm Worker Movements, 1946-72."' American Sociologicxil ' Review, 
42:249-67. 
King, Wayne. 1981. -"Chavez Faces Xnternal- 8nd External Struggles." New York 
Times, 121518 1. 
Kushner, Sam. 1975. Long Road to Delario. New York: International Publ. 
-- 
Larrowe, Chatles. 1975, -Harry Bridges. New . York: Lawrence -Hill Co. 
Levy, Jacques. 1975. Cesar Chavez: Autobiography of La Causa. New York: 
Farrar, Strauss, Giroux. 
Lindsey, Robert. 1979. -"Chavez Faces Criticism From Within His Union." 
Watsonville-Register Pajaronian, 2110179. 
London, Joan and Henry Anderson. 1970. So Shall W e  'Reap. New York: 
Thomas Y. Crowell. 
Ma jka, Theo. 1978. "Regulating Farm Workers: The Sta te  and Agritulliral 
Labor Supply in California,"' Contemporary Crises, 2:141-55. 
- 
Matthiessen, Peter. 1971. Sal Si Puedes. New York: Dell. 
McConnell, Grant. 1977. The Detline 'of Agarian Democracy. New York:' Athenium. 
McWilliams, Carey. 1971. Factories in the Fields. Santa Barbara: Peregrive. 
Morin, Alexander. 1952. The Organization o f  Farm Labor in the  United States. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard Studies in Labor in Agriculture. 
Morris, Aldon. Forthcoming.. Origins of the Civil'Righ-ts Movement. New York:' 
Free Press. 
Moskowitz, Milton, Michael Katz and Robert Levering (eds.). 1980. Everybody's 
Business. New York: Harper and Row. 
. . NACLA (North American Congress on Latin America). 1976. "Del Monte: Bitter 
Fruits,"' Latin America and Empire Report, V. X, No. 7. 
Pfeffer ,  Max. 1980. "The Labor Process and Corporate Agriculture: Mexican 
Workers in Cdifornia,"-Insurgent Sociblogist, ~ ( 2 ) :  25-44. 
Quintana, Joe. 1979. "UFW a t  the  Crossroads: Expansion or Status Ouo?" 
Watsonville. .Register-Pajaronian, 6121179. 
- 
Salinas Californian. Garrett  News Service. Salirias, California, 
Selected issues. 
Scheuring, Ann and Orville' Thompson. 1978. From Lug Boxes t o  Electronics: 
A Study of California Tomato Growers and Sorting Crews. Davis: 
Unixersity of California, Agricultural. Policy Seminar, Monograph #3. 
Scruggs, Otey. 1960. "Evolution of the Mexican Farm Labor Agreement of 
1942."' AgriculmrAl- History, 34: 140-49. 
- ~~rtiniilliam. 1972.-'The Company and the  Union: The Civilized. Rehtionship 
Between GeneMl'Motors and the UAW. New York: Vintage 
Smith, F. J. 1961. The Impact of  Technblogical ' Change in the  Marketing of 
&?ims Lettuce. Ph.D. dissertation, Berki96y University of California. 
Taylor, Ronald' B. 1975, Chavez and the  Farm Workers. Boston: Beacon, 
Thomas, R.J. 1981a..-11Sochl -Organization of I n d u s t i d  ' AgricOltureeW 
Insurgent Sociologist. Vol. X, No. 3: 5-20. 
Thomas, R.J. 1981b. Citizenship and Labor Supp1y:'The Sock1 Organization 
of Industrial Agriculture. Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Sociology, 
Northwestern University. 
, 
Thompson, Edgar T. 1958. "The Plantation ,'I in Edgar Thompson and Everett  
Hughes (eds.), Race:' Individual and Collective Behavior. Glencoci: 
Free Press, pp. 225-36. 
Valvano, Vincent. 1981. -''Concentration and Centralization in U.S. Citrus 
Production." ' Paper presented to the Conference on the  Political ' 
Economy of Food and Agriculture in Advanced Industrial Societies, 
Gue lph , On tar  io . 
Villare jo, Don. 1980. Getting Bigger: Large Scale Farming in California. 
Davis, CA: G l i f o m i a  Institute for Rural-Studies. 
Watson, Don. 1977. "Rise .and Decline of Fruit Tramp Unionism in the  
Western Lettuce Industry,"' paper presented to the Southwest Labor Studies 
Conference, Tempe, Arizona. 
Weiner, Merle. 1978. -"Cheap Food, Cheap Labor: California Agriculture in the  
1930s,"' Insurgent Socicilogist, V. 8, No. 2: 181-90. ' - 
Weir, Stan. 1974. "A Study of Work Culture of  San Francisco Longshoremen." 
Masters Thesis, Department of Labor and Industrhl - Relations, University 
of Illinois. 
Western Grower and Shipper. Magazine of the  Western Growers Association, 
Newport Beach, Gl i fomia .  
Zwerdling, Daniel. 1980. !'The Food Monsters:' in J. Skolriick and Elliot Currie 
(edi-.), Cr is is  in American ~ n s t i t u t i o n s -  ( 5 t h  e d  .). Boston:  L i t t l e  Brown,  
pp. 38-53. , 
